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Abstract. Delay discounting, the belief that rewards decline in value over 
time, is a phenomenon observed in several clinical disorders, including Attention 
Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), substance abuse disorders, and other 
impulse control disorders. Delay discounting behavior is characterized by a 
tendency to choose smaller, more immediate rewards over larger, more delayed 
rewards. This tendency has been associated with behavioral impulsivity and 
inability to delay gratification observed in the aforementioned clinical disorders.  
 It has been suggested that time perception may be a salient feature of delay 
discounting. If the larger, longer-term reward is perceived as being more temporally 
remote, its relative value decreases and is associated with greater cost, and one 
becomes more likely to choose the more immediate reward over the longer-term 
(though optimal) choice.  Time perception has been studied in clinical populations, 
with increased variability of responses as well as both under-production and 
overestimation of time intervals observed in those with ADHD and other disorders 
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associated with impulsivity.  
 The present study used informational feedback via a metronome to change 
belief regarding duration of a second- either increasing or decreasing it by 
approximately 20%. Participants were 132 college-aged students with and without a 
diagnosis of ADHD. Measures of impulsivity and ADHD symptomatology were 
collected as well, and participants completed several cognitive tasks measuring 
working memory and processing speed to explore the impacts of these measures on 
delay discounting and time perception. While participants were able to reliably 
incorporate the altered second belief into short estimations of time (i.e., less than a 
minute), the manipulation failed to generalize to longer-duration temporal 
estimations, and it did not affect delay discounting. Neither ADHD symptomatology, 
impulsivity, nor performance on the cognitive tasks were related to delay 
discounting behaviors, though a working memory measure was correlated with 
baseline (pre-manipulation) time and one longer duration estimation. This lends 
support to a relationship between working memory and temporal perception, 
though the relationship between temporal perception and delay discounting 
remains elusive. Directions for future studies to clarify the role of temporal 




Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Chapter 2: Background and Previous Work…………………………………………….6 
1. Delay Discounting…………………………………………………….….6  
2. Impulsivity and Delay Discounting………………………………18  
3. Time Perception…….…………………………………………………....22 
4. ADHD and Time Perception…………………………………….…..30 
5. Working Memory and Delay Discounting…………………….34 
6. Processing Speed and Delay Discounting…………………….36 
7. Working Memory, Processing Speed, and ADHD………….37 
Chapter 3: Summary and Hypotheses……………………………………………….……39 
Chapter 4: Methods…………………………………………………………………………….…44 
  1.   General Design......................................................................................44 
  2.   Setting.......................................................................................................44 
  3.   Tasks..........................................................................................................44 
  4.   Procedure................................................................................................53 
  5.   Participants and Recruitment........................................................54 
Chapter 5: Results....................................................................................................................57 
  1.  Summary of Collected Data..............................................................57 
  2.  Group Characteristics.........................................................................57 
  3.  Randomization to Metronome Group…………………...……...64 
  4.  Results for Study Aims ......................................................................71 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Delay discounting is a widely studied tendency to prefer smaller, sooner 
rewards over larger, later rewards (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996).  For example, if one is 
offered the choice of receiving $20 or $25 with no strings attached, right now, nearly 
everyone would choose the $25. However, if we alter the scenario to offering $20 
right now, or $25 in three months, many people will choose the $20 now despite the 
fact that the $25 has greater monetary value. What has changed? In this case, the 
future reward has been devalued with respect to the present reward- its subjective 
value has decreased as the variable of time has been introduced. However, not all 
people will respond to this scenario in the same way.  
 Some studies have found that people that exhibit greater levels of certain 
aspects of impulsivity, especially those with clinical disorders such as substance 
abuse/dependence disorders (e.g., addictions to nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, etc), 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and other impulse control 
disorders, tend to devalue future rewards at a steeper rate than those exhibiting 
lower levels of impulsivity (e.g., Reynolds, 2006; Scheres, Lee, & Sumiya, 2007; Green 
& Myerson, 2004). For these individuals, the future reward appears to lose value 
much faster than for a non-impulsive individual. The basis for this preference for the 
sooner reward, even as its monetary value is lowered, is not well understood.  
 At this time, the relationship between impulsivity and delay discounting is 
not clear. Because the valuation of rewards changes as a function of time, it may 
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stand to reason that there may be some temporal aspect that at least partly 
underlies the phenomenon of delay discounting. Research supports the hypothesis 
that impulsivity is related to differential temporal processing, with the finding that 
greater impulsivity is associated with over-estimation of time durations and under-
production of time intervals (e.g. Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Glicksohn et al., 2006). For 
example, in the over-estimation of time intervals, an actual 10-second interval is 
estimated to have lasted 12 seconds.  An example of under-production of a time 
interval would be when asked to tap when 10 seconds have gone by, the individual 
instead taps after only 8 seconds, having believed the interval was longer. Thus they 
have under-produced the desired time interval.  
 Previous studies have examined the correlations between impulsivity, time 
perception, and delay discounting, but these studies have not explored possible 
causal links that may exist between these variables. In order to investigate whether 
a difference in temporal processing causes differential rates of delay discounting, an 
experimental manipulation is warranted.  The present study manipulates an aspect 
of time perception by using an altered metronome that provided false feedback to 
convince the participant a second is longer or shorter than it is. This study then 
examines if this manipulation affects rates of delay discounting.  Comparison of 
results within and between a normative group and an ADHD group allows us to 
attempt to clarify the nature of the relationship between impulsivity in and out of 
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the context of ADHD, and susceptibility to the manipulation and its effects on delay 
discounting.  
 Additionally, there are several other cognitive processes whose relationships 
with temporally myopic decision-making (delay discounting) have not been 
thoroughly examined. To further understand what factors may underlie the complex 
behavior involved with delay discounting, it is worthwhile to examine other factors 
that may be possibly associated with delay discounting, including working memory 
and processing speed. These factors are important to examine because as outlined 
previously, delay discounting has been found to correlate with measures of 
impulsivity; this is coupled with the finding that decreased performance on 
measures of working memory and processing speed have also been correlated with 
higher impulsivity, including in clinical populations with ADHD and other impulse 
control disorders (Finn et al., 1999).  Because degree of delay discounting has been 
correlated with both intelligence and impulsivity (see section 2.2), examining 
specific processes that are shared by both may further clarify what aspects of 
cognition underlie this type of decision-making.   
 
 Specifically, the objectives of the present study are the following: 1. To 
examine how feedback from a device regarding the length of a second can influence 
explicit temporal duration estimations; 2. To determine if this local manipulation of 
temporal perception affects rates of delay discounting; 3. To examine how 
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manipulation of temporal perception affects an ADHD population’s delay 
discounting rates; 4. To examine how self-reported impulsivity may moderate the 
effects of time perception on delay discounting; 5. To examine how processing speed 
and working memory may affect delay discounting.  
 It is hypothesized that 1. feedback and training to a false metronome will 
affect time interval estimates, with exposure and training to 50 beats per minute 
(bpm), but labeled as 60 bpm / 1 beat per second, inducing under-estimations of 
time intervals. Exposure and training to 70 bpm (labeled also as 60 bpm / 1 beat per 
second) will induce over-estimations of time intervals. 2. Those who have been 
exposed to the slow tempo (50 bpm) will show decreased rates of delay discounting 
in a delay discounting task; those exposed to the fast tempo (70 bpm) will show 
increased rates of delay discounting. 3. The ADHD group will exhibit results similar 
to the non-ADHD group, but with a smaller effect size due to inherent greater 
variability of time perception. 4. Higher levels of trait impulsivity in all groups will 
be associated with higher rates of delay discounting. 5. Slower processing speed and 
decreased working memory capacity will be associated with higher rates of delay 
discounting. 
 The remainder of this document is structured as follows. The background 
and previous review section (Chapter 2) defines and gives a review of the delay 
discounting literature, a review of time perception and impulsivity research, and 
how these are explicitly expressed in normal populations and those with ADHD. 
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Chapter 3 will discuss in more depth the current study’s aims and hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 details the methodology and materials of the current study.  Chapter 5 





Chapter 2: Background and Previous Work 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a contextual understanding of the topics 
discussed and examined in this study, and to operationally define the terms used 
throughout. 
2.1 Delay Discounting 
What is Delay Discounting? 
As previously mentioned, delay discounting (also referred to in the literature as 
temporal discounting, time discounting, and hyperbolic discounting) is a tendency to 
assign lower value to an outcome or reward because of its location in the future. 
Stated succinctly, the general rule is “the sooner, the better” (Kirby & Marakovic, 
1996). Delay discounting may manifest both as the tendency to choose a reward 
now to one of equal objective value later in time (e.g. $10 now vs. $10 in a month), or 
the tendency to choose an objectively smaller reward now to a larger reward later in 
time (e.g. $10 now vs. $15 in a month). In this paper, primarily the second 
distinction will be addressed as it more realistically reflects the variance of choices 
present in day-to-day lives- it is difficult to equalize non-monetary choices. 
 Though most commonly associated with monetary reward choices, which are 
secondary reinforcers, similar delay discounting behaviors occur with primary 
rewards, such as with juice (McClure et al., 2007). Delay discounting has also been 
observed in non-human primates, with findings that rhesus monkeys delay discount 
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saccharine administration in a similar way to human’s behavior with money and 
juice (Freeman et al., 2009). It has been observed when the intertemporal interval is 
as short as seconds (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009) and as long as many years. 
 
What is the Importance of Delay Discounting? 
Delay discounting permeates our lives at many junctures. In one form, it may 
manifest itself as deciding to put off a bill one month and instead using the money 
for other pursuits, even though when the bill arrives next month it will include a late 
fee. Another example would be a recent graduate refusing to put away money 
toward retirement- the time that will elapse before the money can be enjoyed feels 
impossibly long and it is felt that the money is better spent in the here and now, 
enjoying youth. Beyond the realm of money, delay discounting can have other 
significant impacts: the child with ADHD spends the night playing video games 
rather than studying for an exam, as the immediate value of playing the game is 
perceived as greater than studying now and doing well on the next day’s exam.  Or 
perhaps the heroin addict chooses to take another pleasurable hit at the expense of 
living a healthy, longer life.  
 The above are all negative consequences of varying severity to delay 
discounting. If the outcomes are suboptimal, how can it be that this behavior pattern 
has been preserved in our species? It may be that a tendency toward delay 
discounting offers security in the present at the expense of security in the future, 
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and our species (like any other) is largely concerned with furthering a genetic line 
rather than an individual living long into the future. Nevertheless, delay discounting 
is largely maladaptive, associated with numerous negative outcomes, including drug 
dependence (see Reynolds, 2006, for review), obesity (Weller et al., 2008), and 
pathological gambling (Alessi & Petry, 2003). Greater understanding into this 
phenomenon may enable us to better understand and treat clinical outcomes 
associated with it.  
   
How can we Characterize Delay Discounting? 
Delay discounting can be characterized by the indifference point, the point at which a 
present option is equally preferred to a future option. Both options, present and 
future, have the same subjective value to the participant. For example, Person A 
equally prefers to receive $20 today or $100 a year from today. We can say the 
indifference point for $100 in a year for person A is $20. Another participant, Person 
B, equally prefers $80 today when compared with $100 in the future. Person B’s 
indifference point for $100 in the future would be $80. In this example, person A is 
exhibiting a steeper decline in value assigned to his future rewards- this would be 
increased delay-discounting. Person B is exhibiting a relatively more shallow decline 
in value- though is still exhibiting delay discounting, albiet at a decreased rate when 
compared with person A.   
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The “steepness” of delay discounting can be described mathematically as a 








 where A is the objective value or magnitude of a delayed reward, V is the 
current subjective value of that reward, D is the delay to delivery of the reward, and 
k is a free parameter that describes the “steepness” of the discounting curve (Kirby, 
1997).  A high k value would represent greater rates of delay discounting, typified by 
person A. A lower k value would describe lower rates of delay discounting (but still 
delay discounting), typified by person B. For illustrative purposes, two sample 
hyperbolic discounting curves are shown below, one steep and one shallow (adapted 
from Coffey et al., 2003): 
 
Figure 1: Two hypothetical delay discounting curves depicting how the relative value 
of an object measured by the indifference point (the point that two objects of 
different objective value are viewed as subjectively equal) changes over time. The 
leftmost curve is steep, corresponding to a higher k value, while the rightmost curve 




 Over time, people’s delay discounting curves flatten: as time extends 
outwards, the delay discounting curve becomes more shallow. Kirby (1997) 
describes this hyperbolic curve as “an attenuation in rate of devaluation with 
increasing delay: value is discounted most precipitously over relatively short delays 
but moderates as delay length increases.” For example, something that is perceived 
to be worth $100 a year from now will be perceived to be roughly worth the same a 
year and a day from now and preferences to receive the money in a year or a year 
and a day will not be strongly differentiated- there will be greater indifference for 
either option. Compare this with the option of receiving $100 today vs. $100 
tomorrow. Though the difference in time is the same (1 day), the preference will be 
much stronger in comparing today with tomorrow as the decline curve in subjective 
value, k, is steeper per unit of time in the near future when compared with the 
further future (Thaler, 1981).   
 It is important to note that the delay discounting curve for an individual is 
not fixed; it has been shown to vary in response to various internal and external 
manipulations. For example, a repeated-measures study found that participants 
exhibited much steeper delay discounting curves when they were deprived of sleep 
versus having adequate sleep (Reynolds & Schiffenbauer, 2004). Though often 
thought of as a trait measure, it is perhaps more accurate to consider it a state-
measure.  Neurobiological evidence exists that differential brain regions are 
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activated as delay discounting curves shift both within and between subjects (e.g., 
review by Peters & Buchel, 2011).  
 
Neurobiological Correlates.  
Currently, there is relatively little work that has examined the neurobiological 
substrates that underlie delay discounting, considering its role in suboptimal human 
behavior. An article by Monterosso et al. (2006) reviews some of the important 
findings. Several structural studies have found that the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), plays a role in determining 
the subjective value of delayed rewards (Bechera, Damasio & Damasio, 1994). 
Specifically, lesion studies have shown that patients with mPFC lesions show 
difficulties with decision making, and have been described as having a strong 
preference to choose immediate rewards rather than invest in future rewards 
(Bechara et al., 1996, 1999). Animal studies also support the role of the OFC in delay 
discounting. OFC lesions in rats produce greater preference for smaller immediate 
rewards over larger future rewards (Mobini et al., 2002).   
McClure et al. (2004) conducted the first functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study of delay discounting. This study found that activation during 
temporal decision making favoring delayed rewards was greater in lateral prefrontal 
and posterior parietal cortices. Conversely, the corticolimbic system was activated 
by immediate reward opportunities. These results were replicated when the reward 
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was juice rather than money (McClure 2007). A similar study examined delay 
discounting in cocaine addicts and demonstrated diminished activation of mPFC and 
ventral striatum in general reward processing, coupled with behavioral preferences 
for the smaller, sooner reward (Potenza, 2008).  
 A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Kable and Glimcher 
(2007) found evidence that the subjective value of delayed rewards is represented 
explicitly in several brain regions. In this study of 10 normative participants, 
increased activation of ventral striatum, mPFC, and posterior cingulate cortex was 
associated with both objective increase of reward, and, importantly, choosing the 
delayed choice when it was perceived as more valuable. Decreased activation of 
these areas was observed when the delay to the reward increased. A follow-up study 
by the same authors found increased ventral striatal, mPFC, and medial OFC (mOFC) 
activation when participants favored the smaller immediate reward, while choice of 
the delayed reward was associated with greater lateral OFC and lateral PFC 
activations.  These brain areas have previously been implicated in the reward-
processing stages of decision making (Rogers et al., 2004).   
 A study by Wittmann et al. (2007) supports this finding that differential brain 
regions are activated in response to choosing long or short term rewards: in a 
hypothetical delay discounting task, activation of striatum, specifically the caudate 
and putamen, covaried positively with perceived delay of reward, with amount of 
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activation coding for delay of reward. This, however, is somewhat at odds with other 
studies implicating greater striatal activation with smaller delays. 
 A study by Tanaka et al. (2004) found differential activation of the striatum 
and insula depending on the behavior strategy participants learned in response to a 
delay discounting task. Specifically, they found that when participants learned to 
select the smaller, immediate reward, ventroanterior regions of the above structures 
and lateral OFC regions showed increased activation. This is contrasted with greater 
dorsoposterior activation of the striatum and insula when participants learned to 
delay gratification and choose the delayed option. In addition, when choosing the 
larger delayed reward, dorsolateral PFC, inferior parietal cortex, the dorsal raphe 
nucleus, and the cerebellum were also activated. Based on these results, they 
hypothesized that ventroanterior regions of the striatum and insula are recruited for 
short-term reward prediction, and the dorsoposterior regions implicated in long-
term reward prediction.   
 In short, these fMRI findings indicate distinct neuronal activation when 
participants choose immediate or delayed rewards in a delay discounting task. 
Greater medial, striatal, limbic and paralimbic activation is observed when 
participants favor the short-term reward, while greater lateral, parietal and 
prefrontal cortical activation was associated with the executive control activated 




 There is also evidence for white matter differences that may contribute to 
delay discounting behavior. A diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) study by Olson et al. 
(2009) found that less impulsive decision making on a delay discounting task (i.e. 
more often choosing the optimal delayed reward choice) in a normative sample of 9-
23 year olds was associated with higher fractional anisotropy and lower mean 
diffusivity of white matter tracts in bilateral frontal and temporal lobes. Fractional 
anisotropy is thought to reflect white matter density, axonal diameter, and 
myelination; in combination with mean diffusivity it can be used to predict the 
integrity of various brain structures. The results of this study indicate better white 
matter integrity is associated with more optimal decision making, at least in the ages 
studied.    
   
 
Economic and Psychological Theories of Delay Discounting 
 
Like any human behavior, the underlying variables that drive delay discounting are  
likely to be many. Most studies examining delay discounting have focused on 
characterizing the phenomenon rather than exploring its causal roots. However, 
there have been several studies that have attempted to answer the question of what 
underlies delay discounting. 
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 There have been several economic theories put forth by researchers to 
explain the delay discounting phenomenon. One theory we can call the interest 
theory, is the belief that the rewards taken immediately may increase in value over 
time, and eventually overtake the value it would have offered if taken in the future 
(Frederick et al., 2002). In other words, $100 received today could somehow gain 
interest, via some mechanism like investment, and ultimately be worth more than 
$100 in the future. However, it is unclear how this mechanism could account for the 
similar delay discounting curves observed in non-monetary reward paradigms, such 
as with juice; or in non-humans that presumably cannot account for this type of 
interest.   
 Similarly, there may be a belief that money offered in the future may be worth 
less than it is now, due to inflation, a tendency for a unit of currency to devalue with 
time. However, this also would not fully explain delay discounting for the same 
reasons the interest theory would not. Because delay discounting has been observed 
on the order of seconds and minutes, it would seem unlikely to assume that money 
could devalue on such a small time scale. This does not, however, rule out a more 
broad belief in the uncertainty of the future. People may fear the long-term reward 
will never come, or at least be less certain of this outcome. This theory makes sense 
from an evolutionary perspective and has been supported in a study that found 
people with steeper discounting curves fared better in a simulated foraging task 
(Critchfield & Atteberry, 2003).  In this study, participants were placed on teams 
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with a goal of collecting the highest amount of limited resources. The measure that 
best predicted individual success within each group was steeper delay discounting 
(measured by a separate task), suggesting the importance of taking the smaller, 
sooner reward in competitive situations with limited availability of resources that 
may mimic past environments.   
A review by Angott (2010) includes working memory as a factor in delay 
discounting.  It is generally understood that taxing working memory interferes with 
responding in a way that require more cognitive control. Hinson, Jameson and 
Whitney (2003) reported just this with regard to delay discounting: loading working 
memory in participants steepened their delay discounting curves. This may support 
a conclusion that the brain reverts to a more “automatic” strategy of processing 
rewards, and that this strategy is biased toward choosing the smaller more 
immediate rewards. This is in line with the previous discussion of the 
neurobiological dual processing systems discussed previously.   
 Withholding a reward for the future can induce unpleasant sensations. 
Loewenstein (1992) in analyzing the works of the economist Senior (1936), 
described how interest is “compensation to the holder of capital for enduring the 
pain of abstaining from consumption, which he viewed as among the most painful 
exertions of human will” (p. 8). Evidence supporting this theory includes the finding 
that when utilizing self-regulatory skills during a period of waiting for a reward, 
children are able to wait longer for the reward (Mischel, 1974). This distraction 
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technique theoretically lessened the “pain” of waiting and lends support to the 
theory that greater attention to the delay increases the likelihood people will not be 
able to stand the wait and choose a sooner reward. 
 This idea of perception of relativity of reward value and temporal interval has 
produced two primary psychological theories proposed to account for the 
discounting: perceived value-based accounts, and perceived time-based accounts.  
Loewenstein (1996) hypothesized that in the same manner that sensory proximity 
determines the strength of the appetitive response (e.g. greater saliva production 
and subjective reports on desire when French fries are placed directly in front of a 
hungry person, compared with those French fries across a football field), temporal 
proximity could affect the steepness of devaluation of rewards. This theory focuses 
on the perceived value of the rewards, whereas the perceived-time-based accounts 
focus on the perception of the delays as a significant contributing factor in delay 
discounting. 
 In the perceived-time-based accounts, it is hypothesized that we experience 
decreased sensitivity to longer time horizons; that is we do not perceive time 
objectively, but rather subjectively, where a week in the future is not perceived 
precisely equal to seven 24- hour periods that we have experienced this week (Ebert 
& Prelec, 2007). Kim and Zauberman (2009a) found in a correlational study that this 
decreased sensitivity to longer future time intervals, combined with a variable of 
individual time contraction (how long or short individuals perceive an interval of 
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time to be), predicts the steepness of the delay discounting curve. Specifically, they 
reported that greater contraction of time units (perceiving a time interval as longer) 
was associated with a steeper delay discounting curve, whereas diminishing 
sensitivity to future time was associated with a more shallow curve. Interestingly, an 
unpublished follow up to this study (Kim and Zauberman, 2009b) found no 
relationship between delay discounting and trait impulsivity, which has been 
historically associated with delay discounting. Despite this finding, many other 
studies to be discussed in the next section have provided evidence that the trait of 
impulsivity is linked with delay discounting in some way.    
 
2.2 Impulsivity and Delay Discounting 
The concept of impulsivity is a complex one, and there has understandably been 
difficulty converging on a unified definition. Moeller et al. (2001) describes 
impulsivity as “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or 
external stimuli with diminished regard to the negative consequences of these 
reactions to the impulsive individual or others.” The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV-TR) characterizes impulsivity as “a 
failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an act that is harmful to 
the person or others” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). It would seem 
intuitive that someone with high levels of impulsivity may have difficulties 
optimizing their choices on a delay-discounting task that relies on being able to 
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withhold an immediate reward for a future reward.  People with ADHD that exhibit 
higher impulsivity exhibit especially steep delay-discounting curves (Scheres, Lee, & 
Sumiya, 2008), though these curves flatten with administration of methylphenidate, 
a stimulant that affects the dopaminergic system (Sheils et al., 2009) (please see 
later discussion of ADHD).  
  
Components of Impulsivity 
The trait of impulsivity is thought to express itself across various domains, which 
can be grossly separated into dissociable cognitive and motor aspects. Motor 
impulsivity has been characterized by patterns of performance seen on tasks that 
require the participant to inhibit a prepotent motor response. For example, in a 
Go/NoGo stop signal task, participants are asked to respond to a stimuli with a 
motor response; however when some signal is provided before the stimuli, like an 
auditory signal, then participants are directed to withhold their response.  The 
inability to withhold this response has been characterized as motor impulsivity and 
can be dissociated from measures of cognitive impulsivity mentioned above 
(Kaladjian et al., 2007).  Logan, Schachar, and Tannock (1997) found that self-
reported impulsivity correlated positively with inability to withhold a prepotent 
motor response on a stop signal task.  
 Robert at el. (2009) outlined many of the cognitive components of 
impulsivity as they are currently understood. The phenomena that paper classifies 
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under the umbrella of cognitive impulsivity include impatience, impulsive decision 
making (including reward decision making and speed of decision making), impaired 
reward learning, risk-taking, reflection impulsivity (a tendency to gather insufficient 
information before making a choice), and delay aversion for gratification. It is easy 
to see how many of these concepts could map on to delay discounting behavior. A 
study by Alessi and Petry (2003) did find a significant relationship between 
cognitive impulsivity and delay discounting in pathological gamblers. However, 
despite the intuition that self-reported impulsivity and delay discounting should be 
linked, the relationship is tentative, with few studies finding a strong relationship 
between the two (Kirby et al., 1999; Crean et al., 2000; Kirby and Petry, 2004; 
Reynolds, 2006). Correlations found in such studies tend to be low, often limited to 
subscales of self-reported impulsivity measures. 
 A scale commonly used to measure self-reported impulsivity is the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS). Principle component analysis by Patton, Stanford, and 
Barratt (1995) of the BIS has found it loads on the following six primary order 
factors: attention, motor, self-control, cognitive complexity, perseverance, and 
cognitive instability. Further analysis by the same team has yielded three broad 
secondary factors onto which the BIS loads: attentional impulsiveness, motor 
impulsiveness, and nonplanning impulsiveness. A study examining the relationship 
between delay discounting and the BIS finds only the nonplanning factor of 
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impulsivity to be consistently associated with delay discounting in normative adults 
(de Wit et al., 2007). 
 A larger exploratory analysis of the hierarchicial structure of 11 self-reported 
impulsivity scales, including the BIS, found at least 7 principal components of 
impulsivity: Prepared/Careful, Impetuous, Divertible, Thrill and Risk Seeking, 
Happy-Go-Lucky, Impatiently Pleasure Seeking , and Reserved (Kirby and Finch, 
2010).  According to this study, delay discounting rates loaded on Impatiently 
Pleasure Seeking, and correlated with the impulsiveness and venturesomeness 
scales from Eysenck et al.’s personality scale developed in 1985, the I7. The authors 
of this study support a discounting model of impulsivity first proposed by Ainslie in 
1975: impulsive choices arise because of the way the relative present values of 
delayed rewards change with the passage of time (Kirby and Finch, 2010). This leads 











2.3 Time Perception 
 
Time perception is an adaptive function that facilitates the ability to predict and 
anticipate events, as well as organize and plan sequences of actions (Mangels, Ivry, & 
Shimizu, 1998). Several studies have noted the link between time perception, 
impulsivity, and an inability to delay gratification with increased rates of delay 
discounting (e.g. Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004; Takahashi , 2005; Barratt, 1983; 
van den Broek et al., 1992; Glicksohn, Leshem, & Aharoni, 2006). Supporting the 
hypothesis that the time perception may be playing a main role in delay discounting, 
it has been found that the same event taking place in past vs. future is valued 
differently (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008). Because perception of time is an 
important variable when studying delay discounting, it is worthwhile to explore 
precisely how it may be contributing to this type of decision making.  
 Lashley (1960) stressed the importance of temporal perception, writing that 
processing of complex stimuli relies on the ability to process order, interval, and 
duration of events. Temporal perception can be contrasted with more spatial 
processing and comparisons, such as those differentiating between angles of bars of 
light shone on the retina. Though virtually all complex processing combines aspects 





How is time perception studied? 
 
There are four chief methods in use to study time perception, as outlined by 
Wittmann and Paulus (2008): 1. A verbal estimation of time duration, in which a 
participant is asked to judge how long an elapsed time interval lasted; 2. a time 
duration task, in which participants are asked to judge when they believe a given 
duration of time has elapsed; 3. duration reproduction tasks, in which participants 
are exposed to a fixed interval of time and asked to reproduce it (i.e. reproducing a 
given tempo); and 4. duration comparison tasks, in which multiple intervals are 
presented and participants pick which was longest or shortest.  Methods 1 and 2 
require that participants explicitly translate their experience of passage of time into 
seconds and minutes, while methods 3 and 4 measure a judgment of relativity that 
does not require second/minute translation.  
 
Cognitive Model of Time Perception 
 
The prevalent cognitive model of time perception, referred to as the “pacemaker-
counter process,” assumes the existence of an internal clock system that generates 
and tracks temporal units (Zakay & Block, 1997).  Wittman & Paulus (2008) outline 
this cognitive model established by Zakay & Block of time perception: a generator of 
units (or pulses of time) is referred to as the “pacemaker”, and its tempo is mediated 
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by arousal, which in turn is moderated by various mood states.  Mood state also 
moderates attention, and attention acts as a switch that turns on a mechanism to 
count the pulses of time generated by the pacemaker. This count is then transferred 
to short-term memory storage, and is used as a reference against a previously stored 
representation of what constitutes a “second” or “minute”. A decision regarding this 
comparison is ultimately made, and the observed behavior output is the result of 
this decision (see Figure 2) (Pouthas & Perbal, 2004).  
 
 




 In this cognitive model, it is important to note that the pacemaker’s rate of 
generating time pulses can be altered by arousal and mood states; it is not a 
constant internal time generator. The subjective experience of time duration is the 
amount of pulses counted by the accumulator as they feed into memory stores. This 
model implies that increased rates of pulses of time would lead to greater 
estimations of duration, as more pulses equals more time. Similarly, it predicts 
slowed rates of pulses generated by the pacemaker would induce underestimations 
of time duration. It has been found that increased arousal, in the form of anxiety, is 
associated with the perception of a slowing of time (i.e., overestimation of duration), 
presumably via a faster pacemaker (Wittman et al., 2006).     
 Attention can also affect time perception in this cognitive model: increased 
attention to time causes the accumulator (as opposed to the pacemaker as outlined 
above) to switch on, allowing for a greater number of “pulses,” or subjective 
temporal units, to generate, which would induce overestimations of time. This 
phenomenon can be observed in normative individuals: when staring at a clock 
during a less engaging lecture, time seems to slow. The cognitive model explains this 
as increased attention causing increased pulses to accumulate, thus creating the 
subjective experience of increased duration of time. Similarly, in line with the saying 
“time flies when you’re having fun”, a lack of attention to the explicit passage of time 
will result in fewer time pulses being accumulated, and an underestimation of time 
duration (Burle & Casini, 2001).  Smokers attempting to quit nicotine experience a 
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subjective slowing of time associated with increased perception of temporal 
duration, which is associated with greater attention to the passage of time (Sayette 
et al., 2005).   
 Another cognitive model of time perception is called the oscillator process 
model, which asserts that perception of time is based on a non-linear, dynamic 
system that attends to temporal intervals embedded in sequences of signals, such as 
music, speech, and movement (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Grondin, 2010). In this model, 
regularly repeating features of stimuli induce future-oriented attention, and create a 
“predictive state”- a tendency to predict the rhythmic pattern of stimuli. Temporal 
processing here relies on the synchronicity of attended internal rhythms (derived 
from predictions from external stimuli) with perceived external rhythms. An 
internal oscillator allows the internal attending rhythm to approach the external 
stimuli rhythms.  Though this model can account for temporal processing, the 
pacemaker-counter process is currently the dominant view (Grondin, 2010).  
   
 
Neurobiological Correlates of Time Perception 
 
Many structures have been implicated in time perception, though in this review 
focus will be placed on the cerebellum, cerebral cortex, and basal ganglia, as they 
have received the most study in regard to explicit time judgment. Ivry, Keele, and 
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Diener (1988) found that lesions to the cerebellum increase the variance of interval 
reproductions. These patients also exhibited diminished ability to discriminate 
between brief time intervals, while their ability to discriminate intensity of sounds 
remained intact.  Imaging studies have implicated both lateral and medial regions of 
the cerebellum in temporal processing across a range of durations, ranging from 
milliseconds (Lewis & Miall, 2003) up to approximately 24 seconds (Tracy et al., 
2000).  
 Several regions of the cerebral cortex have been associated with time 
perception. Most of the literature has focused on the frontal and parietal cortices, as 
well as the supplementary motor area (SMA), as being the primary areas associated 
with time perception. A review by Grondin (2010) highlights several studies that 
implicate various structures: dorsolateral PFC has been associated with brief (<1 
sec) time interval processing (Pouthas et al, 2005); while activation of the general 
right PFC has been associated with short as well as supra-second time processing 
(Koch et al., 2002). It is thought that the “accumulator” from the pacemaker-counter 
cognitive model of time perception is located in frontal cortex regions (Pfeuty, Ragot, 
& Pouthas, 2003).  Binkofski & Block (1996) reported a case study of a previously 
healthy man who had a lesion of the left superior PFC: its effects included perceiving 
time much faster than previously. The man reported that his world appeared to be 
moving in fast-forwarded motion.   
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 SMA activation has been observed when judging time intervals, as when 
participants are asked to explicitly count seconds (i.e. “one one-thousand, two one-
thousand” or “one mississippi, two…”) (Hinton et al., 2004). Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation of the parietal lobe (specifically, right posterior parietal cortex) has also 
been associated with interval duration processing. TMS-induced disruption of this 
area resulted in decreased ability to discriminate time intervals, while the ability to 
discriminate tonal intervals remained intact (Alexander, Cowey, & Walsh, 2005). 
 Finally, the basal ganglia have been studied as a component of time 
perception: fMRI studies have found it is most likely involved with early temporal 
processing and the encoding of time intervals (Rao et al., 2001).  Both the caudate 
and putamen are activated during short as well as longer time interval processing 
(Pouthas et al., 2005; Hinton & Meck, 2004). These brain regions are hypothesized to 
correlate with various aspects of the cognitive pacemaker-process model of 
temporal perception, as outlined by Grondin (2010): temporal perception depends 
on frontal-striatal circuits. The command to “start timing” travels from cortical areas 
to the striatum via topographically-linked fibers. Single-unit studies in monkeys 
have shown that cells in the striatum previously firing at non-united intervals then 
synchronize and create a pattern of neural activity, which is hypothesized to 
correspond to the cognitive pacemaker (Beiser and Houk, 1998). The striatum 
encodes these bursts of activity, and receives a message from the substantia nigra to 
stop firing: when dopamine antagonists (specifically for the D2 receptor) are 
29 
 
administered, interval duration estimations decrease significantly (Meck, 1986). 
This phenomenon is mirrored in Parkinson’s patients whose substantia nigra is 
dysfunctional (Malpani et al., 1998). It is hypothesizd that the striatal activity is 
recorded via these dopamine bursts as the interval length (Rammsayer, 2008).  
 Dopamine has been implicated in several studies as playing a significant role 
in time perception; or at least that its manipulation affects time perception. 
Administration of a D2 receptor antagonist has been shown to decrease pacemaker 
speed in both animals and humans (Rammsayer, 1993). In contrast, administration 
of D2 receptor agonists appears to increase the temporal pacemaker in animals 
(Cheng, MacDonald, & Meck, 2006). When patients with depleted dopamine levels 
with Parkinson’s Disease are administered dopamine replacement therapy (DRT), 
the normally decreased pacemaker is restored to “normal” rates (Pastor et al., 1992). 
This is compared with over-reproduction of a second when DRT is suspended 
(Malpani et al., 1998). This dopamine theory, which places significant emphasis on 
optimal dopamine levels for accurate time perception, integrates well with findings 
on time perception issues in ADHD. In addition, the previously mentioned structural 
studies of temporal perception correspond with areas implicated in ADHD: the 






2.4 ADHD and Time Perception 
 
A primary time-processing deficit has been suggested as a neuropsychological 
endophentype of ADHD. Numerous studies have found an impaired sense of timing 
ranging from the scale of milliseconds to multiple seconds in ADHD populations 
(Barkley, et al., 2001; McInerney & Kerns, 2003; Smith et al., 2002; Valko at al., 
2010). Marx et al. (2010) found that children, adolescents, and young adults with 
ADHD exhibited difficulties with both time discrimination and time reproduction 
when compared with age-matched normative controls.  Valko et al. (2010) found 
these deficits continue to exert their effects well into adulthood.  
 Although in several studies a bias toward temporal overestimation in those 
with ADHD is observed, the most consistent finding is that people with ADHD 
exhibit more variability in their response behaviors: the error variability is more 
erratic than the normative population (Castellanos & Tannock, 2002). These findings 
have been explained by various hypotheses, many of which implicate to a degree 
dopamine dysfunction (Levy & Swanson, 2001; Lowe et al., 2004; Sagvolden et al., 
2005). One explanation of the finding of impaired timing sense is that dysregulated 
dopamine contributes to working memory deficits, impaired response inhibition, 
and poor executive functioning (Barkley, 1997). Thus second-to-second experience 
and responses to the environment appear to be impaired. Interestingly, 
administration of methylphenidate, a psychostimulant affecting the dopamine 
31 
 
system, has been found to decrease response variability and resulted in more 
precise performance on temporal processing tasks, attributed to an enhancement in 
working memory (Baldwin et al., 2004). 
 There are also neurobiological structural differences that support an intrinsic 
time perception deficit in those with ADHD: reductions in volume of prefrontal 
(Mostofsky, et al., 2002), basal ganglia (Semrud-Clikeman et al, 2000) and cerebellar 
(Castellanos et al., 2002) regions, all associated with time perception and 
processing, have been observed in those with ADHD when compared with normative 
controls.    
 Gilden and Marusich (2009) found evidence for a contracted sense of timing 
in ADHD manifesting as a loss of rhythm perception or feeling at slowed tempos. 
This is contrasted with normative controls who were able to maintain and “feel” the 
rhythm at significantly slower tempos than the ADHD group.  This lends evidence to 
the theory that the implicit working memory system of those with ADHD may be 
compromised and be affecting sense of time.  This contraction of time may underlie 
the finding that durations are often overestimated by people with ADHD.  
 Sonuga-Barke et al. (2010) have proposed a triple pathway model to explain 
some of the cognitive and motivational deficits observed in ADHD. This model 
emphasizes a primary temporal processing deficit, in addition to poor inhibitory 
control and increased delay aversion. These three components were shown to be 
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dissociable in an ADHD population, and separated participants from normative 
controls.  
  
Other Factors Affecting Time Perception   
 
In addition to intrinsic attentional difficulties, several other factors have been found 
to affect time perception. As predicted by the previously discussed prevalent 
cognitive model of time perception, explicit attention to time is associated with 
temporal over-estimation (Twenge et al., 2003).  Several physiological states are 
associated with differences in time perception: an increase in body temperature is 
linked with temporal overestimation (Hancock, 1993), as is an increase in 
adrenaline brought about during stressful events (Eagleman at al., 2005). Emotional 
factors appear to play a role as well: happiness induced by happy music led to 
underestimation of interval duration, while sadness induced by sad music was 
associated with temporal overestimation (Bisson, Tobin, & Grondin, 2009). However, 
markedly less emphasis has been placed on the influence of more external factors 
and their effects on time perception. 
 
External Tempo and Time perception 
Very few studies have examined the effects of external tempo on time perception. 
Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn (1983) found that judgment of time intervals depended 
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on the tempo set by a buzzer. Specifically, there was a direct relationship between 
tempo and time interval duration estimation: overestimations of time were 
associated with fast tempo, while underestimations associated with slow tempo. 
This would be in line the cognitive model of temporal perception: faster tempo 
would be interpreted as more time units being ticked off (the internal pacemaker 
being influenced by the external stimulus with greater arousal associated with faster 
tempo), with greater overall accumulation, and thus overestimation of time, with the 
opposite holding true for slow tempo. Feedback, or contextual information, during a 
temporal reproduction task also increases later accuracy: when participants are 
required to tap along in time with an accurate clock, they are more accurate at later 
estimating time (Dutke, 2005). 
 Wearden, Philpott, and Win (1999) found that short trains of clicks at 
different tempos were able to induce overestimation of duration of an auditory 
stimulus that followed the clicks. They also included a condition with clicks and no 
clicks preceding the tone stimuli. The tone stimuli were in reality the same duration 
for all conditions. When a tone was preceded by clicks at 5 Hz, the tone was judged 
as lasting longer than the tone preceded by no clicks.  A tone preceded by clicks at 
25 Hz was judged to last longer than a tone preceded by clicks at 5 Hz. They were 
unable to create a condition in which the duration of the tone was perceived as 
shorter than it was. This finding was replicated in 1996 by Penton-Voak et al., with 
the proposed explanatory mechanism being that the clicks were speeding up an 
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internal pacemaker. Possible biological substrates of such a pacemaker were not 
explored in these papers.  
 Several studies have examined the impact of tempo on time estimation within 
the marketing field, typically studying how ambient tempo affects estimations of 
time spent shopping). Polkosky & Lewis (2002) found that faster auditory tick rates 
while on hold on a phone were associated with temporal overestimation (as well as 
greater anxiety, stress, and impatience). Slower ticking was associated with 
temporal underestimation, but also induced greater stress than a silent condition.  
 Finally, at least one electrophysiology study examined the effect that external 
tempo has on internal states.  In this EEG study, it was hypothesized that external 
visual information may directly affect some internal timekeeping mechanism 
(Johannes et al., 1997).  The study found that when flashes of light with a set tempo 
were shown to participants, the alteration of brainwave patterns was associated 
with more accurate predictions of when the light will flash next. 
 
2.5 Working Memory and Delay Discounting 
 
Working memory is the part of the cognitive system that is used to hold a limited 
amount of information in the focus of attention (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). 
It provides temporary storage and processing of information for use in guiding 
behavior (Baddeley, 2007). Deficits in working memory are linked with poorer 
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learning, comprehension, and academic achievement (De Jong, 1998; Gathercole, 
Pickering, Knight, & Stegmann, 2004). Working memory is necessary for performing 
complex tasks such as planning, problem solving, and decision-making.  
 Several studies have found that increasing demand on working memory is 
correlated with less optimal performance on versions of the Iowa Gambling Task, a 
probability-based decision making task (Worthy, Otto, & Maddox, 2012; Dretsch & 
Tipples, 2007; Bechera & Martin, 2004). However, there are limited studies that have 
examined more directly the relationship between working memory and time-based 
decision-making tasks like delay discounting. Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney (2003) 
found that by placing a load on working memory capacity during a computerized 
delay discounting task, they could steepen (increase) the k value of participants’ 
delay discounting curves. Participants who had greater demand on their working 
memory made more impulsive choices and favored suboptimal temporally proximal 
rewards over delayed optimal rewards. However, a later review of this study 
provided an alternative explanation of these findings, stating that increased working 
memory load appeared to merely increase the likelihood of random responding on 
the delay discounting task, rather than eliciting a clear preference for the immediate 
choice (Franko-Watkins,  Pashler, & Rickard, 2006).  
 While the 2003 study did examine increasing working memory load and its 
effects on k, studies that examine intrinsic working memory capacity and its 
relationship with delay discounting are largely absent from the literature. An 
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exception is a 2008 imaging study by Shamosh et al. that found intrinsic working 
memory capacity predicted delay discounting in normative controls, though only via 
mediation by Full Scale IQ.  In addition, a study by Bickel et al. (2011) found that 
working memory training decreased k discounting values in a sample of people with 
stimulant addictions.  
 Though these few studies have examined the relationship between working 
memory and delay discounting in primarily normative populations, a literature 
search finds no studies that examine working memory capacity in an ADHD 
population and its effects on delay discounting. Impaired decision-making 
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task has been observed in children with ADHD, 
but this task does not explicitly involve judgments involving the passage of time 
(Garon, Moore, & Waschbusch, 2006). Therefore, a measure of working memory 
capacity in an ADHD clinical population will provide information about the 
relationship between working memory and delay discounting. 
 
2.6 Processing Speed and Delay Discounting 
 Processing speed refers to the speed of cognitive processes involved in 
selecting, preparing, and executing a response. Processing speed is a significant 
component of overall IQ, is correlated with working memory, and has been found to 
account for a high degree of age-related memory decline in non-demented older 
adults (Fry & Hale, 1996). Salthouse (1996) has proposed that slower processing 
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speed may leave more time for information stored in working memory to decay, 
which would lead to lower effective working memory capacity. 
 Despite the close linkages between processing speed and both working 
memory and overall IQ, its independent contribution to delay discounting is 
understudied.  A 2008 unpublished master’s dissertation found no relationship 
between processing speed and delay discounting in a sample of normative 
participants (Rambo, 2008).  A 2006 study by Hoffman et al. found no significant 
relationship between trails A or the Stroop color/word (non-interference condition) 
tasks with delay discounting rates in a group of methamphetamine-addicted 
individuals. No studies were found that examined the relationship between 
processing speed and delay discounting in a clinical population with known 
impairment with processing speed such as an ADHD group. 
 
2.7 Working Memory, Processing Speed, and ADHD 
 Deficits of both working memory and processing speed in people with the 
diagnosis of ADHD are widely cited. A meta-analysis of 26 studies found that 
working memory deficits were associated with the diagnosis of ADHD, independent 
of comorbidity with other language learning disorders and general intellectual 
ability (Martinussen et al., 2005).  Processing speed deficits have been observed in 
ADHD populations in a large number of studies (see Jacobson et al., 2011 for a 
review; Shanahan et al., 2006).  
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 It has been hypothesized that working memory deficits may play a causal role 
in many of the cognitive / behavioral deficits seen in ADHD, such as disorganization, 
inattentiveness, poor social skills, and hyperactivity (Kofler, Rapport, Bolden, & 
Altro, 2008). In addition, underlying working memory deficits may also be 
responsible for delay aversion and impulsivity (Rapport et al, 2001).  
A proposed inverse relationship between processing speed and perceived 
time passage has been suggested in a theory paper by Goddard (2000), who 
hypothesized that this could relate to ADHD. Specifically, he wrote that ADHD could 
be caused by a distorted sense of time in which time passes so quickly that 
concentration becomes difficult.  
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Chapter 3: Summary and Hypotheses 
To summarize, delay discounting is a behavior manifesting a tendency to devalue 
future rewards with respect to present rewards.  This behavior is associated with 
many clinical populations and has been shown to be associated with poor outcomes. 
To better understand what underlies delay discounting, we may examine the 
primary variable that is changing within the paradigm, the variable of time.  Several 
clinical populations (notably, ADHD), have been shown to have deficits, or at least 
differences, in time perception. The purpose of this study is to determine if an 
altered sense of time in the seconds-range is associated with decision tasks 
involving longer delays.  
 Additionally, the relationship between delay discounting and working 
memory and processing speed is understudied, especially in an ADHD population. 
Though several studies have examined the effects that manipulating working 
memory via loading or training has on delay discounting in normative and substance 
abuse groups, no known studies have examined the role that intrinsic working 
memory and processing speed capacity may play in delay discounting.  Significant 
working memory and processing speed deficits are observed in those with ADHD 
compared with normative controls, as is increased delay discounting. This study will 
examine to what degree working memory and processing speed capacity may 
underlie delay-discounting behavior in an ADHD population.   
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 Optimal decision-making requires the ability to maintain, access, and 
manipulate stored information and compare it to another piece of information.  If 
working memory capacity is decreased, then presumably fewer pieces of 
information can be accurately maintained, manipulated, and compared with other 
pieces of information. With the many comparisons and values to consider in delay 
discounting (both money values, both time values), it may be possible that lower 
working memory capacity may interfere with making the less impulsive choice. 
 In addition, processing speed may be related to the construct of the “internal 
pacemaker,” with faster processing speed associated with a faster pacemaker / sense 
of time. The prevalent theory of cognitive time-keeping suggests that a faster 
internal temporal pacemaker is associated with greater estimations of time 
durations (due to greater accumulation of temporal units). However, those with 
ADHD tend to have greater variability in estimations of time duration but 
consistently slower processing speed.  Therefore further exploration into the 
interaction between processing speed, working memory, sense of time, and 
decision-making is warranted. 
 
 Hence, the current study has the following specific aims:  
(1) To establish if feedback from a device regarding the length of a second can 
influence temporal duration estimations;  
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(2) To determine if this manipulation of local temporal perception affects rates of 
delay discounting;  
(3) To explore how this manipulation of local temporal perception affects delay 
discounting in an ADHD population; 
(4) To explore the role self-reported impulsivity may be playing in the relationship 
between manipulated temporal perception and delay discounting.   
(5) To determine if intrinsic working memory and processing speed capacity have a 
significant influence on delay discounting; 
(6) To explore how working memory capacity and processing speed affects timing 




It is hypothesized that  
(1) Feedback from a false metronome will affect brief (~20 sec) time interval 
estimates in the following ways: active feedback training to 50 beats per minute 
(bpm), but labeled as 60 bpm / 1 beat per second, will induce under-estimations of 
brief time intervals. Active feedback training to 70 bpm (labeled also as 60 bpm / 1 
beat per second) will induce over-estimations of time intervals.  
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(2) Those who have been trained with the slow tempo (50 bpm) will show 
decreased rates of delay discounting in a delay discounting task with respect to 
those trained with the fast tempo (70 bpm).  
(3) The clinical ADHD group will exhibit delay discounting patterns similar to the 
non-ADHD group in response to the metronome training, but the effect will be 
smaller due to inherent greater variability of temporal perception in the ADHD 
group. 
 
(4)  Higher levels of trait impulsivity in all groups will be associated with higher 
rates of delay discounting, with high impulsivity and exposure to fast metronome 
correlated with steepest delay discounting. 
(5) Working memory capacity will have a significant influence on delay discounting; 
specifically, lower working memory capacity will be associated with increased delay 
discounting rates. Processing speed capacity will have a significant influence on 
delay discounting; specifically, slower processing speed will be associated with 
increased delay discounting rates. 
(6) Working memory capacity will influence time estimation. Specifically, lower 
working memory capacity will be associated with  
 a. less accurate time estimations of both short-term and long-term time    
      intervals 
 b. more training trials needed to reach criterion on metronome task 
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Processing speed capacity will influence time estimation. Specifically, slower 
processing speed will be associated with  
 a. less accurate time estimations of both short-term and long-term time    
      intervals 
 b. more training trials needed to reach criterion on metronome task 
 
All statistical tests are performed at the .05 level of significance. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
4.1 General Design 
This study examined the effects of exposure and training to a slow metronome (“S”) 
or fast metronome (“F”) on delay discounting in an ADHD and non-ADHD 
population. Additionally, it examined how impulsivity, working memory, and 
processing speed may moderate these results. Metronome condition (slow or fast) 
and diagnostic group (no ADHD, ADHD on medication, ADHD off medication) were 
main independent variables, k (steepness of delay discounting) was the main 
dependent variable, and self-reported impulsivity (obtained from the BIS-11), 
working memory capacity, and processing speed were other predictor variables. The 




 The study took place in the Seay Building at the University of Texas at Austin, 
within the Clinical Neuropsychology Lab.  
 
4.3 Tasks 
Demographic / ADHD questionnaire (see Appendix A)  
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 Information on gender and age was collected.  Information on ADHD 
diagnosis (how many years with diagnosis, subtype) and medication (medication 
name, dosage, whether or not the participant was currently on medication) was 
collected as well.   
 
Metronome Task 
 Participants were randomized to either the slow (S) or fast (F) metronome 
group. Participants were advised that since this is a study about timing, they would 
have to remove any watch and put away their cell phones. They were then provided 
with sham educational material (see Appendix B), which emphasized the 
importance of accurate time-perception, with such statements as “studies have 
shown that accurate prediction of time intervals predict later success, wealth, and 
self-reported happiness” and “we are attempting to train people to be more accurate 
time keepers so that more people can experience these measures of success”. The 
statements were provided to attempt to induce greater motivation and adherence to 
the manipulation. 
 After reading through the sham education materials, participants entered a 
room with a computer and metronome. The researcher was equipped with a 
smartphone onto which a metronome program application (“Mobile Metronome”) 
had been loaded. Participants were told that the metronome was set to 60 beats per 
minute, one beat per second. The researcher explained that the goal was to learn 
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how to more accurately estimate time durations by getting an improved sense of the 
accurate length of a second. The researcher then “verified” the rate of the 
metronome with the smartphone by playing synchronous beats for several seconds 
(however, the smartphone was set to match the rate of the metronome, rather than 1 
beat per second). The participant was asked to listen to the metronome and 
encouraged to tap along with the beat “to really get a feel for the length of a second.” 
The metronome then was started and continued running for approximately 20 
seconds. Participants were not told how much time had elapsed. 
 Following this exposure, the metronome was turned off and the participant 
was asked to indicate when they believed 20 seconds have elapsed. Timing 
commenced with a stopwatch so the researcher could record how much time had 
passed. Participants’ answers were recorded. Participants were required to show a 
consistent under or overestimation of the time interval (depending on the tempo 
target), with consistency defined as at least 3 trials below or above the target time. 
Specifically, exposure to the metronome set to 70 bpm had to yield three estimations 
of a 20 second interval equal to or under 18 seconds to be considered successful 
training. Exposure to the slower metronome (50 bpm) had to yield three estimations 
equal to or over 22 seconds to be successful. It was planned to provide up to 10 
learning trials, though 7 was the maximum number needed by any single 
participant. The minimum number of trials administered was 3. The number of 
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training trials required to achieve 3 trials within the specified range was recorded as 
an index of “trainability” to the manipulation. 
 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scales-11 (BIS-11) (see Appendix C) 
 The BIS-11, a self-report questionnaire, has been validated in impulsive and 
normative populations. It consists of 30 items that have been divided into three 
subscales: attentional (inattention- 5 items and cognitive instability- 3 items), motor 
(motor impulsiveness- 7 items and lack of perseverance- 4 items), and nonplanning 
(lack of self-control- 6 items and intolerance of cognitive complexity- 5 items).  Total 
points for each subscale and total score on the entire BIS-11 were used in the 
present study. While some previous studies (e.g. Swann et al, 2002) have shown that 
high impulsivity is correlated with steeper delay discounting, this finding has not 
been consistent and requires further exploration.  
 
Adult Self-Report Scale Symptoms Checklist (ASRS); Adler, et al., 2005; (Appendix D) 
 The ASRS, a self-report questionnaire designed to examine ADHD, has been 
validated in ADHD and normative populations. It consists of 18 questions separated 
into inattentive and hyperactive/impulsive categories. Of the 18 questions, there are 
9 in the Inattentive section and 9 in the Hyperactive/Impulsive section, 
corresponding to the DSM-IV criteria for ADHD.  Each question is rated on a 5-point 
likert scale, yielding values between 0 (corresponding to “never”) and 4 
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(corresponding to “most of the time”). The total sums of points for both the 
Inattentive and Hyperactive/Impulsive symptom sections were entered into the 
model separately to examine the effects of ADHD symptomatology on the relevant 
study aims.    
  
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV): Matrix Reasoning 
 In this task, participants examine a visual design or set of designs and are 
presented with 5 options to pick from to best complete the design. This task 
incorporates visual processing and abstract, spatial reasoning. Performance on the 
Matrix Reasoning task served as a performance-based IQ measurement to ensure 
that groups did not differ in IQ.   Raw scores (ranging from 0-26 for number of 
correct items achieved before the discontinuation rule of 3 incorrect in a row) were 
used as performance variables rather than age-corrected scaled score to allow 
greater variability of scores within the very narrow age range of participants tested.  
Participants were also required to provide an estimation of how much time they 
believe they spent on the Matrix Reasoning task. They were not warned beforehand 
that they would be required to make this estimation. This estimation  served as 
another measure of time processing on a somewhat larger scale than the 20-second 
estimations, allowing for an examination of the generalizability and duration of any 




Delay Discounting Computerized Task 
This served as the main experimental task, with steepness of delay 
discounting (k) as the main dependent variable for the study. A description of the 
delay discounting task is outlined as follows (with assistance from Schoenberg 
[2011]). This task was run on MatLab on a PC and used a computerized adjusting-
amount procedure to measure discounting of delayed monetary reinforcers. The 
program presented participants with an initial amount of either $5 or $10. There 
were three original possible delays (30 days, 60 days and 90 days), counterbalanced 
throughout the sample. The dollar amount of the delayed option ranged from $6 to 
$120 and was determined adaptively with a staircasing procedure (Du, Green, & 
Myerson, 2002). Based on previous literature, it was assumed that each participant's 
pattern of discounting the value of the delayed option will follow a hyperbolic curve 
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Monterosso et al., 2007). The parameter describing the 
steepness of the curve (k) has an average value of approximately 0.013 based on 
previous results from studies in normative adults (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Kirby, 
Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Monterosso et al., 2007). Assuming a hyperbolic discounting 
function, the equation to determine the subjective value of a delayed option is SV = 
V=(1 + kD) where SV = the subjective value of the payment after accounting for its 
discounted value, V = the numerical value of the payment, k = the individual's 
discounting parameter, and D = the delay in days of the payment.  
 The indifference point of each option, where the subjective value of the 
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delayed amount is equal to the actual value of the immediate amount was calculated 
for each participant. This resulted in an option where a person with the same 
discounting parameter will feel that the two options were equivalent. This allowed 
the calculation of the actual value of the delayed amount given the delay and the 
immediate amount: V = SV / (1 + kD) where SV is equal to the immediate amount on 
any given trial.   
 There were 48 adaptive trials: 24 with each immediate value ($5 and $10, 
and 8 occurrences of each delay for each starting value). The immediate and delayed 
amounts were randomly presented in either the left or right sides of the computer 
screen. The task began by assigning a k-value of 0.013 (the average in the normative 
adult population) to each of two staircases, one assigned to all immediate $5 options 
and a second assigned to all immediate $10 options. A combination of the k-value, 
the delay, and the immediate amount was used to determine the delayed amount 
presented to the participant. The only constraint to this approach was that the 
maximum delayed amount was capped at $120. After each trial, the k-value was 
updated based on the QUEST toolbox in MATLAB (Watson & Pelli, 1983).  
 The QUEST parameters were as follows: starting estimate (0.013), standard 
deviation (.02), probability of choosing delayed (0.5), Weibull function parameters 
(beta =5, delta = 0.01, gamma = 0.01), step size (0.001), and range of responses (1). 
If a participant chose the immediate amount, the indifference k-value on that trial 
was smaller than the person's actual k-value and it was increased on the next trial. If 
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a participant chose the delayed amount, the indifference k-value was decreased on 
the next trial. This procedure was used so that the staircases converged at the 
person's indifference k-value by the end of the run. Order of immediate amount and 
delay were random.  
 After 3000 ms if no response was made, a prompt appeared underneath the 
option to remind participants to respond. After the choice was made, a fixation 
crosshair was displayed for 1000 ms before the next trial began. The k-values 
collected provided a quantitative index of the steepness of the discount curve: 
higher k-values reflect greater, steeper discounting by delay.  
 Finally, upon completion of this computerized task, an estimation of time 
spent doing this task was collected and used as another measure of time processing 
to examine the generalizability and duration of the metronome manipulation task. 
 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV): Digit Span  
Digit span is a measure of attention, concentration, and working memory 
capacity. Participants are required to repeat a series of aurally presented numbers of 
increasing length in 1) the order of presentation, 2) in reverse order and 3) in 
ordinal sequence. Test-retest reliability is .83 (Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009). For 
the current study, the combined raw score on digits forward, digits backward, and 
digits sequenced will be the main variable analyzed in this task. In addition, the 




N-back Computerized Task for Matlab (adapted from Multidimensional-N-back, Nick 
Penaranda, George Mason University)  
The N-back task is a continuous performance task designed to measure 
working memory ability.  A sequence of letters appear on a computer screen one 
letter at a time, and participants are required to compare the current letter with the 
letter they saw 3 screen previous.  They are asked to indicate whether it was the 
same letter or a different letter by button response.  For the current study, the 
number correct of 100 trials will be the main variable analyzed in this task. 
 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV): Symbol Search 
Symbol Search is a measure of processing speed that requires participants to 
decide if either of two visual designs is represented in a span of five designs. 
Participants have 120 seconds to complete as many of the 60 items as possible. Test-
retest reliability for this measure is 0.81, and is correlated .65 with digit-symbol 
coding, another measure of processing speed (Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009).  For 
the current study, raw score of correct items completed in 120 seconds will be the 
main variable examined. 
 
Color naming task (adapted from D-KEFS Color/Word Interference Test) 
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Color naming is a measure of processing speed that requires participants to 
verbalize the names of 48 rectangular color blocks as quickly as possible without the 
confounding effect of reading ability. For the current study, time in seconds required 
to name the colors was the main variable examined.  
 
Debriefing and Manipulation check (appendix E) 
 This form examined to what degree the participants believed the metronome 
was accurate on a scale of 1 to 5, and then provided debriefing information. 
 
4.4 Procedure 
 All participants filled out an informed consent form. Upon completion, they 
were asked if they had any questions. Any questions were answered, and 
participants were then provided with the sham educational material and completed 
the metronome task manipulation as described above.  
 Immediately following successful manipulation, participants were provided 
with instructions and then administered the computerized delay discounting task. 
Upon completion of the delay discounting task, participants were asked to estimate 
the duration of time they spent doing the computerized task. Next, they were 
administered the Matrix Reasoning subtest from the WAIS-IV. Once they reached 
discontinuation criteria for this subtest (three incorrect answers in a row), they 
again were asked for an estimation of how long they spent on that task. Actual time 
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elapsed for both the delay discounting task and Matrix Reasoning was recorded as 
well to obtain an accuracy score by subtracting estimated duration from actual 
duration.  
 The 81 participants from the 2nd wave of the study were then administered a 
color-naming task adapted from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System, the 
Digit Span subtest from the WAIS-IV, the Symbol Search subtest from the WAIS-IV, 
and a computerized N-back task.    
 Following completion of the cognitive tasks, all participants filled out the 
questionnaires in the following order: 1. Demographics, 2. BIS-11, 3. ASRS. All 
participants were then asked to rate on a scale of 1 – 5 to what degree they believed 
the metronome was accurate (i.e., actually beating at 60 bpm) to obtain a measure of 
how much they believed the manipulation represented accurate timing. Finally, 
participants were debriefed by the researcher that the metronome was inaccurate. 
Each participant was provided with a debriefing form explaining the experiment, 
revealing the inaccuracy of the metronome, and providing educational information 
about the nature of the study with contact numbers for any additional questions.   
 
4.5 Participants and Recruitment 
Recruitment. Participant recruitment was initiated upon The University of Texas at 
Austin IRB approval of the study and was conducted through three means. First, 
recruitment occurred through the PSY 301 subject pool at The University of Texas at 
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Austin, which allows students enrolled in introductory psychology classes to obtain 
course credit through participation in research as subjects. Subjects were recruited 
for this study through a static posting in the online subject pool management system 
known as OPERA. Secondly, posters approved by the IRB to target students with 
ADHD were placed at the Services for Students with Disabilities office in the Student 
Services Building at UT.  Thirdly, in coordination with Austin Neuropsychology, PLLC, 
patients (age 18+) with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD and who had previously 
provided consent to be contacted as potential study participants were provided 
information regarding this study and an invitation to participate. 
 
Inclusion / Exclusion Criteria. Participants with a self-reported history of head injury 
with resultant loss of consciousness; epilepsy; comorbid psychiatric diagnosis; and 
current intoxication were excluded from the study. Hearing and vision were 
adequate for testing purposes for all participants, verified by their ability to 
correctly follow written directions on the forms and computer screen and 
appropriately respond to the researcher’s auditory questions. Participants were 18 
years or older (range: 18 – 27; M = 19.22; SD = 2.12). 
 For the ADHD group, either self-report of registration with the Office of 
Students with Disabilities for ADHD or diagnosis from Austin Neuropsychology, 
PLLC, was required. For inclusion into the study, participants with a diagnosis of 
ADHD were also required to bring in a bottle of their current stimulant medication 
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with their name on the label. An ADHD symptoms checklist (ASRS) was completed 
by both the normative controls and the ADHD group. Participants were asked to 
abstain from stimulant medication for 24 hours prior to the testing.  Despite this 
request, 17 of 38 ADHD participants did take their medication the day they were 
tested. Thus, current medication state (e.g., on or off stimulant medication) was 
included as another variable in statistical analyses as outlined in the results. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
5.1 Summary of Collected Data  
One hundred thirty-nine individuals participated in the study. Seven participants 
were excluded due to spoiled data collection (equipment malfunction).  Of the 
remaining 132 participants, 38 had a clinical diagnosis of ADHD and 94 had no 
history of ADHD.  All participants were included in the analyses that address study 
aims 1-4. Analyses for study aims 5 and 6 were completed using the entire sample of 
38 participants with a diagnosis of ADHD and 37 non-ADHD participants. Group 
characteristics are presented below for each data set.   
 
5.2 Group Characteristics 
Demographics: Study Aims 1-4. 














mean years (SD) 




33.0 52.9 52.4 X2(2)=3.918; 
p=.141 
Handedness  
% right handed 
88.3 82.4 100 X2(2)=0.414; 
p=.520 
Table 1: Group characteristics for study aims 1-4. 
 
A one-way ANOVA determined age did not significantly differ across the diagnostic 
groups. Chi-squared testing found gender composition ratios did not differ across 
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diagnostic groups. There were significantly more right-handed participants than 
left-handed participants in both ADHD groups (binomial test p=.000), as well as the 
non-ADHD group (binomial test p=.000), but no differences in rates of left 
handedness across these groups. All 132 participants, with one exception from the 
ADHD on medication group, were current undergraduate college students at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  
 
Demographics: Study Aims 5 & 6. 














mean years (SD) 




35.1 52.9 52.4 X2(2)=2.330; 
p=.312 
Handedness  
% right handed 
91.9 82.4 100 X2(2)=3.976; 
p=.137 
Table 2: Group characteristics for study aims 5 & 6. 
 
A one-way ANOVA determined age did not significantly differ across the diagnostic 
groups. Chi-squared testing found gender composition ratios did not differ across 
diagnostic groups. There were significantly more right-handed participants than 
left-handed participants in both ADHD groups (binomial test p=.000), as well as the 
non-ADHD group (binomial test p=.000), but no differences in rates of left 





Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS).  
ASRS FACTOR NON-ADHD:  
STUDY AIMS 1-4  
(N=94) 
MEAN (SD)  
NON-ADHD: 












(possible range: 0-36) 
14.24 (4.18) 15.16 (4.05) 22.12 (5.78) 22.43 (5.17) 
Hyperactivity/ 
Impulsivity 
(possible range: 0-36) 
10.95 (4.83) 10.00 (4.06) 19.35 (6.85) 18.24 (6.02) 
Total Score 
(possible range: 0-72) 
25.09 (7.74) 24.89 (6.39) 41.47 (11.35) 40.67 (10.11) 
Table 3: ASRS scores for diagnostic groups. 
 
 A one-way ANOVA was used to determine if ASRS scores for inattentiveness, 
hyperactivity/impulsivity, and total score differed by diagnostic group (i.e., no ADHD 
(N=94), ADHD on medication (N=17), ADHD off medication (N=21)) for the 
participants used in study aims 1-4. Please see table above for descriptive data. 
Results of the ANOVA revealed significant differences between groups for 
inattentiveness score: F(2,129)=42.010, p=.000; hyperactivity/impulsivity: 
F(2,129)=29.254, p=.000; and total score: F(2,129)=45.889, p=.000. Post-hoc testing 
using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons found that participants 
without ADHD endorsed significantly lower levels of inattentiveness, 
hyperactivity/impulsivity, and total scores than both the ADHD on medication and 
ADHD off medication groups, p=.000. There were no significant differences in ASRS 
scores within the ADHD group depending on medication status. 
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 The same pattern of results was observed when comparing the subset of 
controls (N=37) used in study aims 5 and 6 with the ADHD participants: a one-way 
ANOVA found there were significant differences between groups for inattentiveness 
score: F(2,72)=20.673, p=.000; hyperactivity/impulsivity: F(2,72)=25.142, p=.000; 
and total score: F(2,72)=31.566, p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons found that the participants without ADHD 
endorsed significantly lower levels of inattentiveness, hyperactivity/impulsivity, and 
total scores than both the ADHD on medication and ADHD off medication groups, 
p=.000.   
  The World Health Organization categorizes scores for both the 
Inattentiveness subscale and the Hyperactivity/Impulsivity subscale on the ASRS as 
follows: 0-16 = Unlikely to have ADHD; 17-23 = Likely to have ADHD; 24+ = Highly 
likely to have ADHD.  The results above show that the mean scores on both 
Inattentiveness and Hyperactivity fall in the “Unlikely to have ADHD” category for 
the non-ADHD group; while both of these scores for both ADHD groups fall into the 
“Likely to have ADHD” category.  It is important to note that other criteria outlined in 
the DSM-IV are required for a diagnosis of ADHD.  Therefore, while scores on the 
ASRS reflect ADHD symptomatology, these scores in isolation are insufficient to rule 









scores on ASRS  
NON-ADHD:  






















4 0 0 0 
Combined Type 
Classification 
6 1 13 13 
Total meeting at least 
one classification;  









Table 4: Classifications by diagnostic group based on ASRS scores. 
 
See table above for information on participants for all groups who meet 
ADHD classification for the three subtypes of ADHD based on ASRS scores.  
Twenty-eight of 94 of the controls for study aims 1-4 self-reported ASRS 
scores above the threshold for ADHD classification, as did 12 of the subset of 37 
controls used for study aims 5 and 6. Thus, analyses were run both including these 
participants and excluding them when ADHD diagnosis was a factor examined.  
Additionally, scores from the ASRS were used as continuous variables when 
indicated in the following analyses to further explore any contributing role of these 












Barratt Impulsiveness Scale- 11 (BIS-11).  
BIS-11 FACTOR NON-ADHD: 












(possible range: 5-20) 
9.91 (2.40) 9.24 (2.47) 13.87 (2.68)  
Cognitive Instability 
(possible range: 3-12)  
6.15 (1.75) 5.92 (1.94) 8.05 (1.94) 
Attention Total 
(possible range: 8-32) 
16.06 (3.43) 15.16 (3.63) 21.92 (4.02) 
Motor 
(possible range: 7-28) 
14.20 (3.16) 14.68 (3.07) 17.18 (4.24) 
Perseveration 
(possible range: 4-16) 
6.61 (1.27) 6.38 (1.34) 7.53 (1.74) 
Motor Total 
(possible range: 11-44) 
20.81 (3.67) 21.05 (3.84) 24.71 (5.19) 
Self-Control 
(possible range: 6-24) 
11.81 (3.00) 11.57 (2.66) 15.01 (3.61) 
Cognitive Complexity 
(possible range: 5-20) 
11.05 (2.26) 10.70 (2.60) 12.37 (2.95) 
Non-Planning Total 
(possible range: 11-44) 
22.86 (4.44) 22.27 (4.59) 27.38 (5.18) 
BIS-11 Total Score 
(possible range: 30-120) 
59.84 (8.27) 58.49 (8.87) 74.01 (12.35) 




BIS-11 FACTOR-  
ADHD PARTICIPANTS 
ONLY 
ADHD- ON MEDS 
DURING TESTING  
N=17 
MEAN (SD) 






(possible range: 5-20) 
13.94 (3.51) 13.81 (1.86)  t(36)=0.15; p=.883 
Cognitive Instability 
(possible range: 3-12)  
8.12 (2.15) 8.00 (1.82)  t(36)=0.18; p=.856 
Attention Total 
(possible range: 8-32) 
22.06 (4.99) 21.81 (3.16)  t(36)=0.19; p=.852  
Motor 
(possible range: 7-28) 
16.47 (4.27) 17.76 (4.23) t(36)=-0.93; p=.358 
Perseveration 
(possible range: 4-16) 
7.35 (1.84) 7.67 (1.68)  t(36)=-0.55; p=.587 
Motor Total 
(possible range: 11-44) 
23.82 (5.07) 25.43 (5.30)  t(36)=-0.95; p=.350 
Self-Control 
(possible range: 6-24) 
13.85 (4.31) 15.95 (2.69)  t(36)=-1.84; p=.075 
Cognitive Complexity 
(possible range: 5-20) 
12.18 (3.26) 12.52 (2.73) t(36)=-0.36; p=.723 
Non-Planning Total 
(possible range: 11-44) 
26.03 (5.67) 28.48 (4.60) t(36)=-1.47; p=.150 
BIS-11 Total Score 
(possible range: 30-120) 
71.91 (14.23) 75.71 (10.64) t(36)=-0.94; p=.352 
Table 6: BIS-11 scores within ADHD groups. 
 
A one-way ANOVA was used to determine if BIS-11 scores for each subfactor 
(i.e., attention, cognitive instability, motor, perseveration, self-control, cognitive 
complexity), factor (i.e., attention total, motor total, non-planning total), and total 
score differed by diagnostic group for the participants used in study aims 1-4. Please 
see tables above for descriptive data. Results of the ANOVA revealed significant 
differences for all factors: attention F(2,129)=34.051, p=.000; cognitive instability 
F(2,129)=14.950, p=.000; motor F(2,129)=10.482, p=.000; perseveration 
F(2,129)=11.913, p=.004; self-control F(2,129)=16.086, p=.000; cognitive 
complexity F(2,129)=3.892, p=.023; attention total F(2,129)=35.459, p=.000; motor 
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total F(2,129)=12.650; p=.000; non-planning total F(2,129)=14.199. p=.000; and 
total score: F(2,129)=30.279, p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons found that participants without ADHD 
endorsed significantly lower levels of each factor than both the ADHD on medication 
and ADHD off medication groups, all p=.000. There were no significant differences in 
ASRS scores within the ADHD group depending on medication status, all p>.05.  
 For the subset of participants analyzed in study aims 5 & 6, the findings were 
consistent with the patterns above. Specifically, a one-way ANOVA found differences 
between diagnostic groups for all BIS-11 variables: attention F(2,72)=29.780, 
p=.000; cognitive instability F(2,72)=11.209, p=.000; motor F(2,72)=4.859, p=.010; 
perseveration F(2,72)=5.265, p=.007; self-control F(2,72)=13.636, p=.000; cognitive 
complexity F(2,72)=3.396, p=.039; attention total F(2,72)=28.801, p=.000; motor 
total F(2,72)=6.590, p=.000; non-planning total F(2,72)=11.598, p=.000; and total 
score F(2,72)=20.107, p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons found that participants without ADHD endorsed significantly 
lower levels of each factor than both the ADHD on medication and ADHD off 
medication groups, all p=.000. 
 
5.3 Randomization to Metronome Group 
Study Aims 1-4 (N=132). To ensure no systematic differences across the two 
metronome conditions and the three diagnostic groups for age and intellectual level, 
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measured by Matrix Reasoning raw score, after randomization, a 2 (metronome 
condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANOVA was conducted for each variable.  Age of 
participants did not differ across diagnostic groups: F(2,126)=0.267, p=.766; or by 
metronome condition: F(1,126)=0.016, p=.901. There was a trend for Matrix 
Reasoning raw scores to differ by diagnostic group: F(2,126)=2.935, p=.057; but 
scores did not significantly differ by metronome condition: F(1,126)=0.048, p=.927. 
Specifically, mean Matrix Reasoning raw score for the no ADHD group was 20.64 
(SD=3.826); ADHD on medication mean was 19.18 (SD=3.957), and ADHD off 
medication was 19.95 (SD=3.776).  Because of this trend, Matrix Reasoning raw 
score was used as a covariate where indicated. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed that the control group reported fewer ASRS symptoms of 
hyperactivity/impulsivity than either ADHD group, with no significant difference in 
levels of hyperactivity/impulsivity within the ADHD group. There was also no 
significant interaction between diagnostic group and metronome condition for 
either age: F(2,126)=0.272, p=.762 or Matrix Reasoning raw score: F(2,126)=0.012, 
p=.988.  
 Chi-squared tests found no differences in handedness or gender across the 
three diagnostic groups or two metronome groups: gender distribution by 
metronome condition: X2(1)=0.327, p=.597; gender distribution by ADHD group: 
X2(2)=3.918, p=.141; handedness distribution by metronome condition: 
X2(1)=0.255, p=.613; handedness distribution by ADHD group: X2(2)=3.500, p=.174.  
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 To ensure no systematic differences across the two metronome conditions 
and the three diagnostic groups for ASRS symptoms of inattentiveness and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity, a 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) 
ANOVA was conducted for each variable.  There was no main effect of metronome 
condition on ASRS score: F(1,126)=0.297, p=.587. There was a main effect of 
diagnostic group on inattentiveness symptoms on the ASRS:  F(2,126)=43.141, 
p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction confirmed that the control 
group reported fewer ASRS symptoms of inattentiveness than either ADHD group, 
with no significant difference in levels of inattentiveness within the ADHD group. 
This confirmed that the diagnostic groups continued to differ on this measure after 
randomization. The interaction between diagnostic group and metronome condition 
for ASRS inattentiveness approached significance: F(2,126)=2.973, p=.055. Post-hoc 
testing using the Bonferroni correction revealed that for controls, ASRS scores did 
not differ by metronome assignment. However, for participants with ADHD currently 
on medication, mean ASRS score for those assigned to the slow metronome trended 
higher than scores of those assigned to the fast metronome; this trend was reversed 
for participants with ADHD off medication. Specifically, the mean ASRS 
inattentiveness score for ADHD participants on medication assigned to the slow 
condition was 20.00, SD=5.92. The mean ASRS inattentiveness score for the same 
clinical group assigned to the fast condition was 24.50, SD=4.90. For those with 
ADHD not currently on medication, mean ASRS inattentiveness in those assigned to 
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the slow condition was 23.64, SD=6.19; the mean ASRS inattentiveness for this 
clinical group assigned to the fast condition was 21.10, SD=3.64. All ADHD groups 
remained in the “likely to have ADHD” classification based on mean ASRS scores. 
A 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANOVA was conducted 
for ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity as well. There was no main effect of metronome 
condition on ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity: F(1,126)=0.129, p=.720. There was a 
main effect of diagnostic group on hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms on the ASRS: 
F(2,126)=29.422, p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction 
confirmed that the control group reported fewer ASRS symptoms of 
hyperactivity/impulsivity than either ADHD group, with no significant difference in 
levels of hyperactivity/impulsivity within the ADHD group. This confirmed that the 
diagnostic groups continued to differ on this measure after randomization. There 
was no significant interaction between diagnostic group and metronome condition 
for ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity: F(2,126)=0.983, p=.377.  
See tables below for means of these measures by metronome group.  
 
PARTICIPANTS: STUDY AIMS 1-4:   









No ADHD (N=94) 14.38 (4.15) 14.11 (4.24) 
ADHD- on medication (N=17) 20.00 (5.92) 24.50 (4.90) 
ADHD- off medication (N=21) 23.64 (6.19) 21.10 (3.64) 




PARTICIPANTS: STUDY AIMS 1-4:   









No ADHD (N=94) 11.79 (4.75) 10.11 (4.82) 
ADHD- on medication (N=17) 18.33 (8.79) 20.50 (4.00) 
ADHD- off medication (N=21) 19.09 (6.52) 17.30 (5.60) 
Table 8: ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity by diagnostic and metronome groups. 
 
Study Aims 5-6 (N=75). To ensure no systematic differences across the two 
metronome conditions and the three diagnostic groups for age and Matrix 
Reasoning performance after randomization for the participants in study aims 5 and 
6, a 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANOVA was conducted for 
each variable.  For age, there was no main effect of metronome condition: 
F(1,69)=.075, p=.785, nor any main effect of diagnostic group: F(2,69)=.106, p=.900. 
There was also no significant interaction between diagnostic group and metronome 
condition for age: F(2,69)=0.388, p=.680.  
 
PARTICIPANTS: STUDY AIMS 1-4:   









No ADHD (N=94) 20.47 (3.73) 20.81 (3.95) 
ADHD- on medication (N=17) 18.00 (4.36) 18.00 (7.95) 
ADHD- off medication (N=21) 19.82 (4.40) 20.10 (1.73) 




For Matrix Reasoning, raw scores did not significantly differ by metronome 
condition: F(1,69)=0.325, p=.570. There was, however, a trend toward a main effect 
of diagnostic group on Matrix Reasoning raw score: F(2,69)=3.852, p=.086. There 
was no significant interaction between diagnostic group and metronome condition 
for Matrix Reasoning raw score: F(2,69)=0.540, p=.585. Post-hoc testing using the 
Bonferroni correction found that participants without ADHD compared with ADHD 
participants who had taken their medication that day did not significantly differ, 
p=.101; all other pairwise comparisons were not significant at higher p values.  
However, due to a trend toward significance, Matrix reasoning score was used as a 
covariate where appropriate in subsequent analyses. 
 Chi-square tests found no differences in handedness or gender across the 
three diagnostic groups or two metronome conditions: gender distribution by 
metronome condition: X2(1)=.017, p=.896; gender distribution by diagnostic group: 
X2(2)=2.330, p=.312; handedness distribution by metronome condition: 
X2(1)=0.668, p=.414; and handedness distribution by diagnostic group: X2(2)=3.976, 
p=.137. 
 To ensure no systematic differences across the two metronome conditions 
and the three diagnostic groups for ASRS symptoms of inattentiveness and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity for study aims 5 and 6, a 2 (metronome condition) by 3 
(diagnostic group) ANOVA was conducted for each variable.  There was a main effect 
of diagnostic group on inattentiveness symptoms on the ASRS:  F(2,69)=21.685, 
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p=.000, with the ADHD groups reporting more symptoms of inattention. ASRS 
inattentive symptoms did not significantly differ by metronome condition: 
F(1,69)=0.777, p=.381. There was a trend for an interaction between diagnostic 
group and metronome condition for ASRS inattentiveness: F(2,69)=2.637, p=.079. 
This is the same trend and same participants from studies 1-4, again showing that 
for participants with ADHD currently on medication, mean ASRS score for those 
assigned to the slow metronome trended lower than scores of those assigned to the 
fast metronome; this trend was reversed for participants with ADHD off medication.  
The means of both ADHD groups, however, remained in the “likely to have ADHD” 
category based on ASRS cutoffs.  
A 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANOVA was conducted 
for ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms as well for groups used in study aims 
5 and 6. There was a main effect of diagnostic group on hyperactivity/impulsivity 
symptoms: F(2,69)=24.696, p=.000. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that the control participants reported fewer hyperactive/impulsive 
symptoms on the ASRS than either ADHD group, and that the two ADHD groups (on 
medication and off) did not significantly differ from each other on this measure.  
ASRS hyperactivity/impulsivity did not differ significantly by metronome condition: 
F(1,69)=0.083, p=.774. There was no significant interaction between diagnostic 




See tables below for means of these measures by metronome group.   
PARTICIPANTS: STUDY AIMS 5&6:   









No ADHD (N=37) 14.61 (3.91) 15.68 (4.22) 
ADHD- on medication (N=17) 20.00 (5.92) 24.50 (4.90) 
ADHD- off medication (N=21) 23.64 (6.19) 21.10 (3.64) 
Table 10: ASRS inattentiveness scores by diagnostic group and metronome condition 




PARTICIPANTS: STUDY AIMS 5&6:   









No ADHD (N=37) 10.78 (3.56) 9.26 (4.45) 
ADHD- on medication (N=17) 18.33 (8.79) 20.50 (4.00) 
ADHD- off medication (N=21) 19.09 (6.52) 17.30 (5.60) 
Table 11: ASRS hyperactivity / impulsivity scores by diagnostic group and 
metronome condition (study aims 5 & 6). 
 
5.4: Results for Study Aims 
STUDY AIM 1: To establish if feedback from a device regarding the length of a 
second can influence temporal duration estimations.  
 Hypothesis: Feedback from a false metronome will affect brief (20 sec) 
time interval estimates in the following ways: active feedback training 
to 50 beats per minute (bpm), but labeled as 60 bpm / 1 beat per 
second, will induce under-estimations of brief time intervals. Active 
feedback training to 70 bpm (labeled also as 60 bpm / 1 beat per 




 A 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) by 5 (trial) repeated 
measures ANOVA was used with metronome condition (slow, fast) and diagnostic 
status (no ADHD, ADHD on medication, ADHD off medication) as the between 
subjects measures, and trial number (baseline, T1, T2, T3, and delay) as the 
repeating measure within subjects.  This test was run with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction due to Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity being violated: X2(9)=209.793, 
p=.000.  
 Results of this ANOVA determined that there was a significant main effect of 
trial number on mean time estimation: F(2.176, 271.948) = 4.622, p=.009. There was 
a main effect of metronome speed on mean time estimation across trials: F(1.088, 
271.958)=161.208, p=.000. There was no main effect of diagnostic group on mean 
time estimation F(2.176, 271.948)=0.070, p=.934. There was a significant 
interaction effect between metronome condition and trial number on mean time 
estimation across trials: F(2.176, 271.948) = 30.059, p=.000. There was no 
significant interaction between trial number and diagnostic group on time 
estimations: F(4.351, 271.948)=0.612, p=.668. There was no significant three-way 
interaction between trial number, metronome speed, and diagnostic group on time 
estimations: F(4.351, 271.948)=1.165, p=.327.  
 Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that time estimations 
collapsed across diagnostic group differed between the metronome conditions at 
training trials 1, 2, 3, and the delay, but not at baseline (see figure and table below 
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for results), with participants assigned to the slow metronome group over-
producing 20 second time intervals, and participants assigned to the fast 
metronome group under-producing 20 second time intervals. 
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 Removing the participants without a diagnosis of ADHD who scored above 
threshold on the ASRS for inattentiveness and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity did not 
alter the patterns of significance for the above findings.  
 
 
Metronome Training Trials- Learning and Duration.  
 In general, participants were easily oriented to the manipulation and most 
required only 3 training trials to reach criteria (3 trials with estimations greater 
than or equal to 22 seconds for the slow group, 3 trials with estimations less than or 
equal to 18 seconds for the fast group). Only 12 of 132 participants (9.1%) required 
more than 3 training trials to reach criteria. Of those 12 participants, 9 required one 
additional training trial, 2 required two additional trials, and one participant 
required five additional trials.  A 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) 
ANOVA found that there was no main effect of metronome condition on number of 
trials required to reach criteria: F(1,126)=0.360; p=.550. There was also no main 
effect of diagnostic group on number of training trials required to reach criteria: 
F(2,126)=1.217; p=.300.  There was no significant interaction between diagnostic 
group and metronome condition on number of trials required to reach criteria: F(2, 
126)=0.815, p=.445. 
 However, within the ADHD group, a Bonferroni-corrected post hoc test found 
that participants who did not take their prescribed ADHD medication the day of 
testing required more trials to reach criteria, requiring a mean of 3.24 trials 
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(SD=.437) compared to those on ADHD medication, who required a mean of 3.00 
trials (SD=.000). Due to the small number of participants in both these groups who 
required more than 3 trials, equal variances were not assumed for that analysis: 
t(16)=-2.219; p=.041.     
 
 Immediately preceding debriefing, participants were asked to rate on a scale of 
1 to 5 how confident they were the metronome condition they had been training to 
was accurate (i.e., beating at 60 beats per minute).  A rating of 1 was equivalent to 
definitely thinking it was not accurate, and a 5 equivalent to definitely thinking is 
was accurate. 74% of participants thought the metronome was “definitely” or 
“probably” accurate. The median response was a 4. Participants were equally likely 




1: Definitely thought it was not accurate 2.9 
2: Thought it was probably not accurate 12.9 
3: Chances of it being accurate 50/50 10.1 
4: Thought it was probably accurate 46.8 
5: Definitely thought it was accurate 27.3 
  Table 13: Ratings of belief in metronome accuracy. 
 
 Estimations of longer amounts of time (i.e., time spent on the delay discounting 
task and time spent on the Matrix Reasoning task) were elicited as well, with no 
cueing that we would be asking for these estimations. To determine if the 
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metronome training had an impact on longer time estimations a 2 (metronome 
condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANCOVA with time estimation for the delay 
discounting task serving as the dependent variable and the actual time spent on the 
task as the covariate was completed. There was no main effect of the covariate, 
actual length of time spent on the delay discounting task, on delay discounting  time 
estimations: F(1,125)=1.270, p=.262. There was no main effect of metronome 
condition on delay discounting estimations: F(1,125)=0.271, p=.604. There was also 
no main effect of ADHD group on delay discounting estimations when controlling for 
actual length of task: F(2,125)=1.565, p=.213. There was also no interaction between 
metronome condition and diagnostic group on delay discounting estimations when 
controlling for actual length of task: F(2,125)=0.191, p=.827. Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance found no difference in variances of estimations between 
the diagnostic groups, F(2,129)=0.925, p=.399. 
 
 Similarly, a 2 (metronome condition) by 3 (ADHD group) ANCOVA was used for 
time estimations for the Matrix Reasoning test with metronome condition and 
diagnostic group as the independent variables, estimation of time (seconds) spent 
on the delay Matrix Reasoning as the dependent variable, and time actually spent on 
the Matrix Reasoning task as a covariate. There was a significant main effect of the 
covariate, length of time actually spent on the Matrix Reasoning task, and 
estimations of time spent on it: F(1,125)=44.090, p=.000. There was no main effect 
77 
 
of metronome condition on Matrix Reasoning estimations when controlling for 
actual length of task: F(1,125)=0.003, p=.956. There was also no main effect of ADHD 
group status on Matrix Reasoning estimations when controlling for actual length of 
task: F(2,125)=0.184, p=.832. There was also no interaction between metronome 
condition and diagnostic group on Matrix Reasoning estimations when controlling 
for actual length of task: F(2,125)=0.447, p=.641. Levene’s test for homogeneity of 
variance found no difference in variances of estimations between the diagnostic 
groups, F(2,129)=1.357, p=.261. 
  Removing the participants in the no-ADHD group who scored above threshold 
on the ASRS for inattentiveness and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity did not alter the 
patterns of significance for the above findings.  
 
 
STUDY AIM 2: To determine if this manipulation of local temporal perception 
affects rates of delay discounting.  
 Hypothesis: Those who have been trained with the slow tempo (50 
bpm) will show decreased rates of delay discounting in a delay 
discounting task with respect to those trained with the fast tempo (70 
bpm).  
 
STUDY AIM 3: To explore how this manipulation of local temporal perception 
affects delay discounting in an ADHD population. 
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 Hypothesis: The clinical ADHD group will exhibit delay discounting 
patterns similar to the non-ADHD group in response to the metronome 
training, but the effect will be smaller due to inherent greater variability 
of temporal perception in the ADHD group. 
 
The above two aims are combined in following analyses. Mean k for the entire 
sample (N=132) was .0389, with .0022 standard deviation. The observed range of k 
was 0 to .0944. Skewness was 0.743, with 0.211 standard error.  A 2 (metronome 
condition) by 3 (diagnostic group) ANOVA was used to determine how k may be 
affected by these variables. There was no main effect of metronome condition on k: 
F(1,126)=.024, p=.878. There was no main effect of ADHD group on k: 
F(2,126)=0.757, p=.471. There was no interaction between metronome condition 
and ADHD group: F(2,126)=.343, p=.709. The mean k of the slow group was .0378, 
SD=.0254; mean k of the fast group=.0399, SD=.0265 (see figures below).  Removing 
the participants in the No-ADHD group who scored above threshold on the ASRS for 
inattentiveness and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity did not alter the patterns of 
significance for the above findings. Please see Appendix F for k convergence curves 





  Figure 4: K by metronome condition, collapsed across diagnostic groups. 
 
 Figure 5: K by metronome condition and diagnostic group.  
 
A multiple linear regression examining effects of ADHD symptoms (i.e., scores 
on the ASRS Inattentiveness and Impulsivity/Hyperactivity subscales) was used to 
examine any effects on k. ASRS total scores for each of the two subscales were 
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entered together into the regression. ADHD symptoms on the ASRS did not 
significantly predict k: F(2,129)=0.858, p=.426, R2=.013.  
A post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected t-test examining the effects on k of those 
who reported they “definitely” or “probably” believed the metronome was accurate 
vs. those who did not found no significant difference between the two groups, 
t(130)=-1.539; p=.126.  
  
 
STUDY AIM 4: To explore the role self-reported impulsivity may be playing in 
the relationship between manipulated temporal perception and delay 
discounting.    
 Hypothesis: Higher levels of trait impulsivity in all groups will be 
associated with higher rates of delay discounting, with high impulsivity 
and exposure to fast metronome correlated with steepest delay 
discounting. 
 
 Mean BIS-11 score for the entire sample (N=132) was 63.92 (SD=11.53); the 
range was 44-102. Although no established clinical cut off scores exist in the 
literature for the BIS-11, other studies have suggested the use of the 75th percentile 
score for high impulsivity (Malone et al., 2009). In the current study, a quartile 
analysis showed this top cutoff was at score 71. Participants above this value were 
considered “high impulsivity” for the purposes of this analysis (n=30).  The bottom 
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quartile cut off score was at 57.  Participants below this value were considered “low 
impulsivity” for the purposes of this analysis (n=31). 
 A 2 (high impulsivity vs low impulsivity) by 2 (metronome condition) ANOVA 
was used with the sample of 61 participants who fell into either high or low 
quartiles of impulsivity to examine effects on dependent variable k. The high 
impulsivity group consisted of nine control participants, nine participants with 
ADHD on medication, and twelve participants with ADHD off medication. The low 
impulsivity group consisted of thirty control participants and one participant with 
ADHD on medication. There was no main effect of impulsivity on k: F(1,57)=0.200, 
p=.656. Within this sample, there was also no main effect of metronome condition 
on k: F(1,57)=0.055, p=.815. There was also no significant interaction between 
impulsivity and metronome condition on k: F(1,57)=2.140, p=.149. 
 BIS-11 total score for the entire sample of participants (N=132) was not 
correlated with k, Pearson correlation=0.005; p=.954. This was also true when the 
ADHD sample was examined independently, Pearson correlation=0.119; p=.477.  
  A multiple regression was used on the entire sample of participants to 
predict k from the three subscales of the BIS-11 entered together (attention, motor, 
and non-planning). These variables did not significantly predict k, F(3,128) = 0.670, 





STUDY AIM 5: To determine if working memory and processing speed capacity 
have a significant influence on delay discounting. 
 Hypothesis: Working memory capacity will have a significant influence on 
delay discounting; specifically, lower working memory capacity will be 
associated with increased delay discounting rates. Processing speed capacity 
will have a significant influence on delay discounting; specifically, slower 
processing speed will be associated with increased delay discounting rates. 
 
 For this study aim, all analyses were performed on the subset of the total 
participants who received these cognitive measures (N=75: 37 no-ADHD 













































20.81 (2.73) 22.32 (2.89) 23.03 (8.37) 21.36 (3.07) 
Symbol Search  # 
correct  (Primary 
Measure) 
40.49 (7.28) 40.24 (8.34) 35.65 (6.75) 37.81 (7.70) 
Digit span total 
score (Primary 
Measure) 
29.18 (5.04) 28.71 (4.46) 29.00 (4.85) 28.95 (4.74) 
     Longest Digit 
span forward 
6.55 (1.15) 7.24 (1.20) 7.04 (1.08) 7.13 (1.17) 
     Longest Digit 
span back 
5.13 (1.27) 4.71 (0.92) 4.96 (1.23) 4.87 (1.12) 
     Longest Digit 
span sequenced 
6.55 (1.36) 6.24 (1.09) 6.32 (1.26) 6.13 (1.17) 
     Longest digits 
forward - longest 
digits back 
*1.18 (2.26) 2.41 (1.58) 2.13 (0.95) *2.24 (1.26) 
N-back task- 
total correct  of 
100 (Primary 
Measure) 
*79.03 (8.29) 74.71 (10.14) 73.76 (12.58) *74.18 (11.41) 
Table 14: Cognitive measures by diagnostic group. 
 *= significant difference between groups at the p<.05 level. 
 
The above table shows a summary of the cognitive data. The primary 
processing speed measures used in subsequent analyses were color naming time 
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(seconds) and Symbol Search number correct in 120 seconds. Performance on these 
two measures were not significantly correlated, Pearson's r(75)= 0.191; p=.106. The 
primary working memory measures used in subsequent analyses were n-back total 
items correct of 100 and digit span total score. These two measures were 
significantly correlated, Pearson's r(75)=0.329, p=.004.  
An ANOVA was used to examine any group differences in mean performances 
with regard to each of the cognitive measures individually (see table above). No 
significant differences were found between the three diagnostic groups, all p>.05. 
However, when medication status was collapsed across the ADHD group, there were 
significant differences between controls and ADHD participants on longest digits 
forward minus longest digits back, as well as the N-back task. Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc testing revealed that the control participants had a smaller difference 
between digits forward and digits back, as well as more items correct on the N-back 
task.  
Removing the participants in the No-ADHD group who scored above 
threshold on the ASRS for inattentiveness and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity for the 
above measures found only one significant difference between groups, a difference 
on symbol search number correct: F(2,58)=3.579, p=.034. Specifically, when 
removing these participants from analysis, people with ADHD not currently on 
medication performed worse on symbol search than those without ADHD and those 
with ADHD on medication. 
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Medication status was then collapsed within the ADHD group and differences 
were examined between the ADHD and non-ADHD groups on these measures.  The 
difference between longest digits forward and longest digits back was larger within 
the ADHD group as compared with the non-ADHD group: F(1, 73)=5.063, p=.027. 
Additionally, those without ADHD performed significantly better on the N-back task 
than those with ADHD: F(1, 72)=4.206, p=.044). This finding remained significant 
when the participants without a diagnosis of ADHD who scored above threshold on 
the ASRS for inattentiveness and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity were removed.  
 A multiple linear regression was performed to predict k from the four 
main cognitive measures entered together (N-back score and digit span total score 
for working memory; and color naming time and Symbol Search number correct for 
processing speed), while controlling for any effects of Matrix Reasoning raw score. 
Matrix Reasoning raw score failed to predict k: F(1,69)1.221, p=.273, R2=.017. These 
four main cognitive variables did not significantly predict k, controlling for Matrix 
Reasoning score: F(5,65) = 1.093, p=.373, R2= .078.  
 Because only N-back and digits forward minus digits back were significantly 
different between the ADHD and non-ADHD groups (as well as symbol search once 
ADHD-like controls were removed), these three variables were entered together as 
variables in a multiple regression analysis to examine impact on variable k. The 
multiple linear regression analysis found that neither of the independent or 
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STUDY AIM 6: To explore how working memory capacity and processing speed 
affects timing training to a metronome.  
 Hypothesis: Working memory capacity will influence time estimation. 
Specifically, lower working memory capacity will be associated with  
o less accurate time estimations of both short-term and long-term time   
intervals  
o more training trials needed to reach criterion on metronome task 
 Hypothesis: Processing speed capacity will influence time estimation. 
Specifically, slower processing speed will be associated with  
o less accurate time estimations of both short-term and long-term time   
intervals  
o more training trials needed to reach criterion on metronome task 
 
  
For these study aims, all analyses were performed on the subset of the total 
participants who received these cognitive measures (N=75). 
 
Working memory. Two-tailed correlational analyses were performed to examine the 
relationship between the two primary working memory variables (digit span total 
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score and N-back performance) and absolute value of deviation of baseline time 
estimation of 20 seconds (before exposure to the metronome) from 20 seconds 
(henceforth referred to as “short-term accuracy”). Digit span total score was not 
correlated with short-term accuracy of baseline time estimation: r(75)=-0.88, 
p=.451; nor was performance on the N-back task: r(75)=-0.031, p=.795.  
 To examine the relationship between working memory on longer time 
duration estimations, two-tailed correlational analysis were performed to examine 
the relationship between digit span total score and N-back performance and 
absolute value of deviation of estimation of time spent on the delay discounting task 
from actual time spent on it (henceforth referred to as “long-term accuracy”). The 
results of this analysis indicated that digit span performance is not related to long-
term accuracy, r(72)=-0.122, p=.300. The same analysis was performed with N-back 
performance in place of digit span total score and also found no relationship 
between N-back performance and long-term accuracy: r(71)=-.064, p=.593.  
 Correlations were performed between digit span total performance and long-
term accuracy of time estimates for the Matrix Reasoning task as well. The results of 
this correlational analysis indicated that digit span performance is not related to 
long-term accuracy for the Matrix Reasoning task: r(72)=0.185, p=.115. N-back 
performance was also not related to long-term accuracy for the Matrix Reasoning 
task: r(71)=0.005, p=.969.  
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 Neither total digit span performance nor N-back performance were 
correlated with number of training trials required to reach criteria during the 
metronome training: digit span r(75)=0.195, p=.093; N back r(74)=.012, p=.921.  
 
Processing Speed. Two-tailed correlational analyses were performed to examine the 
relationship between the two primary performance speed variables (Color Naming 
time and Symbol Search number correct) and short-term accuracy of baseline 
estimation. Digit span total score was not correlated with short-term accuracy of 
baseline time estimation: r(75)=.043, p=.716; nor was performance on the Symbol 
Search task: r(75)=0.148, p=.213. 
 With regard to processing speed and longer time duration estimations, two-
tailed correlational analyses found no relationship between Color Naming time and 
long-term accuracy on the delay discounting task, r(72)=0.064, p=.586, nor long-
term accuracy on the Matrix Reasoning task, r(72)=-0.119, p=.311.  The same 
analyses were performed with Symbol Search performance in place of Color Naming 
time.  There was no relationship between Symbol Search performance and long-
term accuracy on the delay discounting task, r(70)=-.026, p=.825; nor long-term 
accuracy on the Matrix Reasoning task, r(70)=0.009, p=.941.   
Neither Color Naming time nor Symbol Search performance were correlated 
with number of training trials required to reach criteria during the metronome 




 In addition to examining the relationships between these cognitive measures 
and baseline short-term accuracy, possible relationships between the cognitive 
measures and baseline estimation response value (i.e., the actual time at which the 
participant indicated 20 seconds has elapsed) were explored as well. These analyses 
focused on the relationship on perception of length of time of 20 seconds, rather 
than deviation from the “correct” response. A correlational analysis found that total 
digit span performance was related to baseline time estimation, r(75)=.245, p=.028. 
Removal of a single outlier from the ADHD on medication group (estimation of 20 
seconds was 44 seconds, more than 3 standard deviations from the mean) improved 





Figure 6: Relationship between Digit Span total performance and baseline 
20-second estimation. 
 
Performance on the N-back task was not correlated with baseline estimation, 
r(74)=.109; p=.357, nor was Symbol Search performance, r(75)=.080, p=.080. There 
was, however, a trend toward a relationship between Color Naming time and 
baseline estimation, r(75)=-.217, p=.062, with faster performance on Color Naming 
trending toward a correlation with longer baseline estimations. However, this trend 
weakened with removal of a single outlier from the ADHD group not currently on 
medication whose Color Naming time (30 seconds) was more than three standard 




Relationships between the cognitive variables and estimations of longer time 
durations were examined as well in correlational analyses. With regard to working 
memory, N-back performance was not correlated with time estimations of duration 
of the Matrix Reasoning task: r(74)=.034, p=.771; nor delay discounting task: 
r(74)=-.164, p=.163. Digit span performance was not correlated with delay 
discounting task time estimation, r(75)=.026, p=.828.  
Digit span total performance was correlated with Matrix Reasoning time 
estimation: r(75)=.264, p=.022, though a partial correlation analysis found this 
relationship was partially accounted for by Matrix Reasoning raw score: 
r(72)=0.197, p=.136. 
  With regard to processing speed, performance on Symbol Search was 
correlated with neither estimations of longer durations of time on the Matrix 
Reasoning task: r(70)=.084, p=.483; nor delay discounting task, r(72)=.030, p=.802. 
Performance on the color naming task was correlated with neither Matrix Reasoning 
time estimation: r(72)=-.024, p=.840; nor delay discounting task time estimation: 




Chapter 6: Discussion   
Timing Manipulation. The findings of the current study suggest that it is possible to 
use a simple manipulation to shift explicit estimations of short-term time durations. 
More specifically, it is possible to use an altered metronome coupled with persuasive 
educational materials to convince young adults with and without ADHD that a 
second is about 20% slower or faster than it actually is (i.e., 50 or 70 beats per 
minute as opposed to 60). This belief that a second is slower or faster than reality 
was associated with productions of short time intervals that conformed to a timing 
change in the desired direction. When asked to produce a 20-second interval, this 
manipulation induced interval productions that were scaled up or down according 
to the direction of the manipulation of the second. In the majority of the young 
adults tested, this change required only three brief trials with the altered 
metronome to obtain a stable and durable change in reproduction of the altered 
timing.  This manipulation lasted the length of the study, approximately 45-minutes, 
even without any warning that there would be another short-term timing estimate 
at the end of the experimental session.  
When participants were asked explicitly if they believed the metronome they 
heard at the beginning of the study was beating at a true 60 beats per minute, or one 
beat per second, the majority answered yes. Thus, both behavioral data and 
subjective report verified that this manipulation was successful in altering belief 
about the length of a second.  
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 Studies have suggested a primary timing deficit in people with ADHD (e.g., 
Barkley, et al., 2001; McInerney & Kerns, 2003; Smith et al., 2002; Valko at al., 2010).   
In the present study, medication status within the ADHD group did appear to have 
an effect on number of trials required to learn the timing manipulation, with 
unmedicated participants with ADHD requiring slightly more trials to reach criteria 
than those on medication, suggesting that medication may be partly compensating 
for a timing difficulty within the ADHD group. This is inconsistent with at least one 
other study examining the effects of stimulant medication on time processing that 
found administration of methylphenidate to children with ADHD did not improve 
the accuracy of their time interval reproductions (Barkley et al., 1997). A literature 
search revealed no studies that have examined the effects of medication of timing in 
adults with ADHD. It should be noted that only four participants within the entire 
ADHD group required more than three trials to reach criteria, and these four 
participants were all in the unmedicated group. Due to the limited variance within 
these two groups with respect to trials required, this finding warrants replication 
within a larger sample.  
Although greater variability in timing has also been found in those with 
ADHD, in the present study, variability of timing responses (at baseline and during 
the metronome trials) between the three diagnostic groups did not significantly 
differ. There may have been an insufficient sample size to reveal much variability: 
observed power for study aim 1 was sufficient for effects of metronome condition 
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(observed power=.999), but lower when taking into account diagnostic group by 
metronome condition over trials (observed power=.286).  When variance was 
examined between the three ADHD status groups for longer time estimations, those 
evaluating amount of time spent on the delay discounting task and the Matrix 
Reasoning task, there were again no significant differences. This result is surprising 
given the numerous studies that have found more variable performance in those 
with ADHD, especially those not currently on medication (e.g., Castellanos & 
Tannock, 2002). Results may have looked differently if we were to examine a 
medication-naïve group of people with ADHD, with those with no medication in 
their systems over a longer period of time showing greater variance of responses. 
For the ADHD participants, the amount of time since last taking their medication 
ranged from several minutes before the study began (for participants who 
spontaneously reported accidentally taking their medication immediately preceding 
the study) to about 24 hours, though this information was not formally collected in 
this study. With the half-life of Adderall, the stimulant medication most often 
reported by participants in the current study, being approximately four hours 
depending on body weight, and wash-out time equivalent to approximately five half-
lives (Swanson et. al., 1998), there were likely many participants that still had 
residual medication in their systems.  Our sample did include 4 participants with 
ADHD who were not currently on medication, but this was an underpowered sample 




 In terms consistent with the Zakay cognitive model of time perception, the 
metronome manipulation was most likely altering the reference memory that 
represents of the length of a second. While traditionally this reference memory is 
referred to as a stable component of the model existing in long-term memory 
storage, in this study it appears the manipulation was able to override this 
representation and replace it with a new reference point, at least for short-term time 
estimations. This new reference point for a second was durable over time as tested 
in this study and following tasks that did not require the participants explicitly 
orient to time or maintain the duration of a second. However, the manipulation 
failed to generalize to longer time periods, an important point that will be discussed.  
In the Zakay cognitive model, there are theoretically many ways to directly 
alter time perception, including speeding up the pacemaker (by increasing arousal), 
switching on an accumulator (by increasing attention), or by interfering with short 
term memory consolidation.    While many other studies have examined the effects 
of attention and arousal on timing, this is the first that appears to have attempted to 
alter the reference point to which comparisons and decisions about timing are 
made. A literature search fails to find any other studies that have attempted any 
similar manipulation on the reference memory of any temporal constant. This novel 
manipulation may be able to be used to study other processes involving timing, such 
as time management skills and ability to delay gratification.  
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Time management skills involve evaluations, whether they are conscious or 
not, of the length of an hour, or a day- all verbal labels we place on amounts of time. 
These labels are important for individual’s decision-making:  different factor values 
must be in place for two people to come to two very different conclusions regarding 
how much work they believe they may be able to accomplish in an hour, for example. 
It is not unreasonable that part of this variance could be accounted for by how long 
that person believes an hour or a day to be. If this were the case, perhaps shifting 
beliefs of duration of those lengths of time could have an effect on attitudes 
regarding what could be accomplished in that time. If it is possible to alter the belief 
of how long a second is, it may be possible to alter the belief of how long an hour is 
in a similar direct manner.  
 Although not an explicit aim of the study, it was a hope that the manipulation 
affecting the length of a second would generalize to longer periods of time. However, 
it failed to generalize to the two retroactive estimations of longer time durations: the 
estimations of time spent on the Matrix Reasoning task and the computerized delay 
discounting task. There are several hypotheses to explain why this may have 
happened. One possible explanation for this lack of generalization is that different 
systems are responsible for tracking smaller vs. longer time durations. Indeed, there 
is evidence (e.g., Meck, Penney, & Pouthas, 2008) that oscillatory dopaminergic 
activity in the striatum is detected by striatal neurons to discriminate sub-second 
intervals of timing. However, at longer (i.e., suprasecond) intervals, more cortical 
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neurons are recruited via cortico-striatal pathways for analyses. In this theory, the 
striatum is the ‘core timer’, while timing sense at a suprasecond scale is distributed 
among coordination of larger-scale neural networks involving greater cortical 
activation. 
Additionally, making retrospective estimations is likely to require a great deal 
of frontal / cortical activity as evaluations weighing different factors occur. Hence, 
manipulation of the perception of the length of a second may have affected one 
system without generalization to the other. Disregarding the metronome 
manipulation, baseline estimations were not associated with the longer time 
interval estimations of either the delay discounting task, lending greater evidence to 
different strategies for long vs. short term estimations.  
 The amount of variability in explicit timing (i.e., paying specific attention to 
how much time is passing) is also likely to increase over longer durations. While 
participants in this study were able to very reliably reproduce small time intervals 
according to a specified tempo, small mistakes can have a cumulative effect as the 
interval grows, which would interfere with accurate timing. If the participants were 
asked to report how many seconds had transpired (rather than minutes) while they 
were doing the delay discounting task, which lasted an average of 9 minutes (540 
seconds), there would doubtlessly be far greater variance in the number of seconds 
reported due to greater opportunities to lose precision as seconds accumulate.  
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 Another possible explanation for the lack of generalization is the differential 
nature of the task demands. Although the two longer time interval estimation tasks 
both required participants to retrospectively estimate the passage of time, the small 
time scale task involved producing an interval. These two different tasks place quite 
different demands on the participant. The shorter task requires active attention to 
timing, while the longer task did not require active attention to timing. The time that 
was passing during the longer time intervals was filled with cognitively-demanding 
tasks not directly related to time, so ability to precisely monitor and track time was 
likely limited or perhaps based of a variety of factors other than the perception of 
the length of a second. 
 To examine the reasons why the manipulation failed to generalize to longer 
periods of time, future study could control for differences by equalizing the task 
demands and manipulating only the durations of time. One way to accomplish this 
would be to set up an experiment where participants are required to generate small 
and also longer amounts of time, so that a dissociation point, i.e. a point at which the 
variability in judgment exceeds accuracy, is revealed.  One way to explore the effects 
of the generative vs. retroactive nature of timing would be to retroactively ask 
participants to estimate how much time had passed after only a small interval of 
time. This could be compared with the generative results to examine if the altered 
timing changed according to type of timing demand, or if the altered timing was 
consistent within both tasks.  
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 Although the metronome manipulation failed to generalize to longer time 
periods, it may nevertheless yield some insight into timing processes and cognitive 
models that attempt to explain them. Timing production tasks are used quite 
frequently in studies that examine people’s sense of time, and the ease with which 
the present study was able to manipulate the perception of the seconds that underlie 
the production shows that the reference memory of a second perhaps should not be 
thought of as a constant factor.  In the Zakay model there are no variables that feed 
into or influence the reference memory, suggesting that it is stable and constant. 
However, again given the ease with which it was shifted in this study, perhaps this 
model needs to be expanded to include factors that may affect the reference 
memory.  
 The metronome manipulation also failed to affect delay discounting rates. 
Delay discounting is a complex phenomenon that is the end result of many cognitive 
processes. Although some evaluation or timing processing must be playing a role in 
delay discounting, as nearly everyone would prefer $100 today rather than $100 
tomorrow, it may simply be that the sum of the other high-level cognitive processes 
outweigh the contributions the variable of perception of length of a second may be 
adding.   
This may be the result of the manipulation failing to generalize to longer 
periods of time, as the task had people make decisions on time scales of days rather 
than seconds. Hyperbolic delay discounting curves have been observed when 
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intertemporal intervals are as short as seconds, though they are less steep than the 
curves observed for longer-term discounting studies.  A future study could examine 
delay discounting rates as affected by the metronome manipulation over much 
shorter periods of time, on a scale of seconds rather than days to avoid the 
confounding issue of longer term generalization. Imaging studies support that 
different systems may be accounting for the different steepness of discounting: 
during discounting tasks on smaller time scales, greater striatal activation has been 
observed in imaging studies, as opposed to more orbitofrontal activation found in 
longer-term discounting tasks (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009).  
In the present study, no variables collected were found to be related to delay 
discounting rates, including impulsivity, ADHD / medication status, hyperactivity 
and inattentive symptoms, processing speed, and working memory. That impulsivity 
was not related to delay discounting rates in this study was somewhat surprising, as 
preference for sooner rewards over delayed rewards would seem to tap into at least 
some aspect of impulsivity. At least one previous study by Swann et al. (2002) found 
that delay discounting was related with high impulsivity on the BIS-11, but this 
finding was not replicated in any subsequent studies. The nonplanning subscale of 
the BIS-11 was found to correlate with delay discounting by de Wit et al. (2007), but 
this finding also failed to replicate within any sample under study here. The current 
sample was comprised almost entirely of students, and even those without ADHD 
reported higher levels of impulsivity on the BIS-11 than the means for the above 
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studies. However, the mean age for the de Wit study was 45 years and 40 for the 
Swann study, whereas for the current study mean age was 19. It may be that high 
impulsivity in middle aged people is developmentally less common and qualitatively 
different than high impulsivity in younger people.   
The current sample of students were also in general showing steeper 
discounting rates than the adult populations many of these studies used: the mean k 
for our control sample was .039 while for the normative adult population in the 
literature a mean k value of .013 is generally reported  (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; 
Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Monterosso et al., 2007). The set of controls in this 
study also reported more ADHD symptoms on the ASRS than the normative 
population. It could be that the relationship between delay discounting and 
impulsivity is different in this set of higher-discounting, more impulsive normative 
controls than in a set of lower-discounting, less impulsive normative controls. 
Additionally, as many studies using this delay discounting measure tend to examine 
preferences in substance abuse populations, their control samples tended to be 
older and not as educated as the current sample. Another possibility is that the 
explicit orientation to time via the manipulation may have caused participants to 
orient their attention specifically to the passage of time, which may have altered 
their behavioral choices.  
ADHD status and medication status within the ADHD group also did not 
affect rates of delay discounting in the current study. This is inconsistent with 
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previous findings. Scheres, Lee, and Sumiya (2008) found that people with ADHD 
that exhibit higher impulsivity exhibit especially steep delay-discounting curves.  
Sheils et al. (2009) duplicated this finding, and showed that k decreased within their 
participant sample with ADHD with the administration of stimulant medication. 
This was not the case with our sample, with neither ADHD status, impulsivity, nor 
current medication status contributing significantly, in any combination, to k.  
However, our study was not a repeated-measures design with and without 
medication, and residual medication effects may have remained in those classified as 
“off medication”.  Also, the lack of actual monetary rewards and use of hypothetical 
rewards may have weakened possible relationships: the Scheres, Lee & Sumiya 2008 
study found that real temporal discounting tasks are more sensitive to ADHD-related 
delay aversion than hypothetical tasks.  
Neither the processing speed measures nor the working memory measures 
were associated with k. While the ADHD group showed clear differences on several 
of these measures when compared with the non-ADHD group, none of these 
measures were correlated with k. The reason for this lack of relationship is not clear, 
but one possible explanation is that neither working memory nor processing speed 
are critical components of delay discounting, a highly complex decision making task. 
Additionally, our rather homogenous group of undergraduates may not have 
exhibited the variability in performance on these measures necessary to reveal any 
impact these traits may have on delay discounting.  
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Among the main four cognitive measures, none were associated with 
accuracy of time estimations. However, disregarding accuracy of estimation, it was 
found that total score on digit span was correlated with the actual value of baseline 
time estimations of 20 seconds, as well as estimation of time spent on the Matrix 
Reasoning task. Participants who achieved lower total scores on digit span tended to 
produce contracted 20-second intervals (i.e., they said “stop” when less than 20 
seconds had gone by). In contrast, participants with higher scores on digit span 
tended to produce expanded 20-second intervals (i.e., they said “stop” when more 
than 20 seconds had gone by). Those with better working memory, of which simple 
attention is a component, may have higher distress tolerance for longer periods of 
“empty” time before declaring time is up than those with poorer attention and 
working memory.   
Digit span total score was also positively correlated with estimation of time 
spent on the Matrix Reasoning task. One confounding factor of this relationship is 
the correlation between Matrix Reasoning score and Digit Span score (r(75)=.274, 
p=.017), and that those who did better on Matrix Reasoning completed more items 
and tended to take longer, so their estimations would likely to be longer.  Though a 
partial correlation found that Matrix Reasoning raw score was accounting for this 
correlation, it may be that this partial correlation was removing some of the working 
memory variance as well. More difficult items on the Matrix Reasoning task place 
demands on working memory to hold and manipulate information, especially when 
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looking for more complex patterns.  Thus, working memory may still be an 
important component of these temporal estimations. However, the N-Back task, 
which also taps into working memory, was not correlated with baseline time 
estimations or Matrix Reasoning duration estimations, which is surprising as 
performance on the N-back task was found to be significantly correlated with digit 
span performance.  
There are several ways these tasks diverge. One way is that digit span and the 
time estimation tasks require a verbal response and attention to auditory stimuli, 
whereas the N-back task does not incorporate auditory information and does not 
require a verbal response.  The N-back task is characterized by a single, continuous 
demand over 100 trials. Contrastingly, digit span has three separate subtasks with 
different, increasingly difficult demands built into it. Digit span total score is the sum 
of digits forward, digits back, and digits sequenced, and so is a mixed index that 
lumps together simple and more complex attention with working memory. It also 
becomes more difficult until a performance ceiling is reached, whereas the difficulty 
of the N-back task does not change over time. Perhaps the multidimensionality of 
digit span was more suited to capture the more complex process of time judgment. 
Though results of the current study present two pieces of converging evidence to 
suggest digit span performance may be related to time estimation, the correlations 




Limitations & Future Directions. 
As discussed previously, though the sample sizes within each metronome 
condition were sufficient, there was insufficient power to examine interactions if any 
were present among the three diagnostic groups over repeated trials. Additionally, 
the study was completed without an initial goal of separating the participants with 
ADHD into different groups depending on medication status, and thus sample sizes 
were not large enough to properly assess the role medication may have been playing 
in these results. Rather than a cross-sectional study, a repeated measures on-
medication/off-medication would better examine this question. Finally, the study 
sample had higher rates of discounting than observed in other studies, which may 
have been related to higher impulsivity, though the nature of this relationship was 
not clear in this study. Future study in these areas may include more clinically-
impaired populations from a wider age group with a wider range of educational and 
current occupational status.  
Overall, it would be important for future studies to include a mechanism for 
examining the point at which the manipulation that alters perceptions of small 
amounts of time fails to translate to longer amount of time. To better understand 
how the manipulation may be affecting time perception, other measures of short-
term time estimations could be taken that incorporate not only producing time 
intervals, but also judging time intervals and comparing various time intervals. 
Additionally, given that delay discounting is such a complex construct, examining 
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other potential factors that may enter into the decision-making process such as 
attitudes toward time passage and current financial status of the individual would 
be worthwhile to study.     
 
In sum, the current study has established a novel technique to alter explicit 
time judgments on a seconds-scale, though this alteration does not appear to affect 
delay discounting, perhaps because it failed to generalize to longer periods of time. 
Delay discounting remains a complex phenomenon whose underlying cognitive 
processes are mostly unknown. Further investigation, possibly incorporating some 
of the studies proposed above, is warranted to clarify the relationship that may exist 













1.  Gender (please circle one):   Male     Female Other_________ 
 
 
2.  Age: ___________ 
 
 




 Yes (if so, when?    _____________________ ) 
 
4. Do you take medication for ADHD? (please circle one)     Yes  No   
 
 4a: if yes, what is the name and daily dosage of the medication?  
 
  ___________________________________________ 
 




Appendix B:  Sham Educational Material 
 
The Importance of Accurate Timing 
 
 An accurate sense of time has been linked with higher IQ (Christianson et al., 
2009), greater average annual salary (The Center for Temporal Perception and 
Studies, 2010), and higher self-reported happiness and life satisfaction (Lymberos, 
Brown, & Aunchman, 2010). Though we all have some sense of time, most people 
have never received explicit training in this area. Thus, one goal of the present study 
is to see if a more accurate sense of timing can be taught to people that may not have 
previously received formal timing education.  
 You will be provided with a metronome that ticks off at 60 ticks per minute 
(1 per second) and asked to tap along with the beat. Following this, you will be 
asked to indicate when you think a certain amount of time has passed. You will 
continue to receive this timing training several times to help us understand how 
people learn how to accurately judge time intervals.  
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Appendix C: BIS-11 
 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations.  This is a 
test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think.  Read each statement and put 
an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this page.  Do not spend too much time on 
any statement.  Answer quickly and honestly. 
          О     О                       О        О 
 Rarely/Never          Occasionally                 Often                Almost Always/Always 
1    I plan tasks carefully.    О      О      О      О 
2    I do things without thinking.    О      О      О      О 
3    I make-up my mind quickly.    О      О      О      О 
4    I am happy-go-lucky.    О      О      О      О 
5    I don’t “pay attention.”    О      О      О      О 
6    I have “racing” thoughts.    О      О      О      О 
7    I plan trips well ahead of time.    О      О      О      О 
8    I am self controlled.    О      О      О      О 
9    I concentrate easily.    О      О      О      О 
10  I save regularly.    О      О      О      О 
11  I “squirm” at plays or lectures.    О      О      О      О 
12  I am a careful thinker.    О      О      О      О 
13  I plan for job security.    О      О      О      О 
14  I say things without thinking.    О      О      О      О 
15  I like to think about complex problems.    О      О      О      О 
16  I change jobs.    О      О      О      О 
17  I act “on impulse.”    О      О      О      О 
18  I get easily bored when solving thought problems.    О      О      О      О 
19  I act on the spur of the moment.    О      О      О      О 
20  I am a steady thinker.    О      О      О      О 
21  I change residences.    О      О      О      О 
22  I buy things on impulse.    О      О      О      О 
23  I can only think about one thing at a time.    О      О      О      О 
24  I change hobbies.    О      О      О      О 
25  I spend or charge more than I earn.    О      О      О      О 
26  I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.    О      О      О      О 
27  I am more interested in the present than the future.    О      О      О      О 
28  I am restless at the theater or lectures.    О      О      О      О 
29  I like puzzles.    О      О      О      О 




Appendix D: Adult Self-Report Scale Symptom Checklist (ASRS) 
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Looking back, to what degree did you believe the time interval you were trained on 
was accurate to one beat per second? Circle one choice. 
 
 
1. Definitely thought it was not accurate.    
 
2. Thought it was probably not accurate, but could be accurate.   
 
3. Thought the chances of it being accurate or not accurate were 50/50. 
  
4. Thought it was possibly not accurate, but definitely could be accurate. 
 
5. Definitely thought it was accurate (60 beats per minute).  
 
 





In the informed consent document you read and signed before the study began, you 
were told the purpose of this study was “to examine the relationship between sense 
of time and decision making in a computerized task.”  The real purpose of this study 
is to examine how believing a second is either slower or faster than it really is affects 
that decision making task. The metronome you listened to and tapped along with 
was not beating at 60 beats per minute like you were told; it was actually beating at 
either 50 beats per minute or 70 beats per minute. 
 
We could not tell you the real purpose of the study in case that would have changed 
your answers or how you acted. 
 
Now that you have been told the real purpose of this study, we want to make sure we 
still have your permission to use your data.  Remember, we want to understand how 
people act in general. We will never draw any results about you personally.  If you do 
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not want your data included, your refusal will not impact current or future 
relationships with The University of Texas at Austin.  It will also not affect any 
compensation you were promised at the start of the study. 
 
Now that you know the real purpose of the study, please do not tell other students 
until after the term is over.  We do not want this detail to influence future volunteers. 
 
Your signature below means that you understand the real purpose of the study. Your 
signature does not constitute a waiver of any legal rights. 
  
Please indicate if you do or do not agree for us to use your data now that you know 




___ I understand the real purpose of the study and allow the researchers to use my 
data. 
  
___ I understand the real purpose of the study and do NOT allow the researchers to 















If you want more information about this study, you can talk to any of the 
investigators: Rachel Berman, rachel.berman@mail.utexas.edu, 617-244-8885; or 
David Tucker, dtucker@mail.utexas.edu.  If you would like to talk about this study 
with someone not involved in the study, you can talk to The University of Texas at 
Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (512) 
471-8871. If you ask, we will protect your identity to the extent possible. You can 
also send an email to orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu or a letter to IRB Administrator, P.O. 
Box 7426, Mail Code A 3200, Austin, TX 78713. 
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Appendix F: Adaptive k by diagnostic group and metronome status over trials 
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